Disguised Patent Policymaking by Vishnubhakat, Saurabh
Washington and Lee Law Review 
Volume 76 Issue 4 Article 7 
Fall 1-6-2020 
Disguised Patent Policymaking 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat 
Texas A&M University School of Law, sv10@law.tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Disguised Patent Policymaking, 76 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1667 (2019), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol76/iss4/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee 
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law 
Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu. 
 
1667 




Patent Office power has grown immensely in this decade, and 
the agency is wielding its power in predictably troubling ways. 
Like other agencies, it injects politics into its decisions while 
relying on technocratic justifications. It also reads grants of 
authority expansively to aggrandize its power, especially to the 
detriment of judicial checks on agency action. However, this story 
of Patent Office ascendancy differs from that of other agencies in 
two important respects. One is that the U.S. patent system still 
remains primarily a means for allocating property rights, not a 
comprehensive regime of industrial regulation. Thus, the Patent 
Office cannot yet claim broad autonomy to make substantive 
political judgments. Indeed, the agency until now has wielded its 
power mostly in disguise. The other difference is that the era of 
broad Patent Office power is still in relative infancy. Recent years 
have seen important analytical and empirical studies of the 
agency’s dramatic changes, but its new and controversial practices 
are not yet entrenched. Meaningful reform is still possible, and it 
is desirable. Patent Office power has grown so much so quickly in 
part because the political valence of that power has been obscured 
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by a blinkered focus on technological expertise. Understanding the 
agency’s pernicious structural choices—such as commingling 
separately delegated powers in order to evade judicial review and 
stacking adjudicatory panels to reach desired outcomes—in terms 
of politicization reveals significant risks of injury upon the 
agency’s ability to make credible commitments, and also 
illuminates potential solutions. 
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The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office or 
USPTO) has begun to make policy in disguise, with enough 
success that the pretense may not be needed much longer. The 
power of the agency has reached a high-water mark, and 
although some of the most important and troubling effects of this 
administrative ascendancy were unintended, they were not 
unforeseeable. For more than a third of a century, institutional 
primacy in the patent system lay in the courts, especially the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.1 Over the same period, 
however, Congress diminished this judicial primacy three times 
in favor of growing agency power, most recently in the 2011 
America Invents Act (AIA).2 The relatively benign nature of the 
first two diminishments,3 together with an incomplete 
understanding of how they relate to the third, explain much 
about why the agency’s power has now started to grow 
unchecked. 
Prior reallocations of power away from the judiciary and to 
the agency rested on broad legislative consensus. Even in the 
AIA, the creation of robust agency proceedings by which 
administrative judges in the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (PTAB) could revoke previously issued patents rights was 
a deliberative, if dramatic, choice by Congress. However, the most 
recent and aggressive expansions of Patent Office power have 
come from inside the agency itself. Upon receiving specific grants 
of discretion from Congress, the Patent Office has advanced 
expansive interpretations of those grants, reflecting ever broader 
claims of its own power.4 At their most extraordinary, these 
 
 1. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: 
Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1962–63 (2013) 
(noting that the Federal Circuit is perceived to be “the most important expositor 
of the substantive law of patents in the United States”). 
 2.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 3.  See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2018) (limiting scope of ex parte review); id. 
§ 311(b) (limiting scope of inter partes review). 
 4.  See, for example, infra Part II.B, discussing how the PTAB has sought 
to insulate itself from judicial review after the AIA made the PTAB’s 
discretionary decision whether to review a case “final and nonappealable,” 35 
1670 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2019) 
claims include the power to stack panels of administrative judges 
to reach desired outcomes in individual cases.5 The agency has 
stacked panels in a number of cases and even multiple times 
within individual cases.6 The agency also claims the power to 
make far-reaching decisions about vested patent rights with 
absolute immunity from judicial review.7 The pattern of 
aggrandizement in the agency’s positions, especially before its 
supervisors in the Federal Circuit, is unmistakable. 
What has been less clear, until now, is why Congressional 
action in this power transfer has been so one-sided. Historically, 
the justifications for enlarging Patent Office power and for 
creating and endowing the Federal Circuit’s own considerable 
power were the same: expertise.8 The Federal Circuit was created 
in 1982 out of a desire for nationally uniform appellate oversight 
in patent litigation, which had previously been fragmented across 
regional circuits.9 Uniformity would come from a single court 
 
U.S.C. § 314(d) (nonappealability of inter partes review); id. § 324(e) 
(nonappealability of post-grant review). 
 5.  See infra Part II.A (discussing the PTAB’s recent practice of 
reconfiguring administrative judge panels with different or additional agency 
judges to produce outcomes it seeks). 
 6. For example, in Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp., No. 
IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2014), the original PTAB panel consisted of 
three judges but by the end, four judges had been added and all seven judges 
voted on Target Corporation’s Motion for Joinder. See Decision Granting Motion 
for Joinder, Target, No. IPR2014-00508, Paper 31 (granting joinder by a vote of 
4–3). 
 7.  See infra Part II.B–II.D (describing the PTAB’s attempts to argue that 
its case selection, statutory time bar, and adjudication decisions are 
unreviewable). 
 8.  See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic 
Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 45, 51–55 [hereinafter Strategic Decision Making] (identifying 
expertise, cost, and accuracy as primary reasons why Congress created a system 
where patent examinations are reviewed within the Patent Office); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 44 note (2018) (Congressional Statement Regarding Appointment of Judges) 
(“The Congress . . . suggests that the President, in nominating individuals to 
judgeships on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit . . . select from a broad range of qualified individuals.”). 
 9. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981) (“The new Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit will provide nationwide uniformity in patent law, will 
make the rules applied in patent litigation more predictable and will eliminate 
the expensive, time-consuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes 
litigation in the field.”). The Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended 
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with exclusive appellate jurisdiction, populated by judges who 
were experts in patent doctrine.10 Since then, a number of 
Federal Circuit judges have also brought substantive expertise in 
science and technology.11 
Meanwhile, the first grant to the Patent Office of power 
broadly to reevaluate already-issued patents came in 1981 with 
the creation of ex parte reexamination.12 Power over patent 
validity previously belonged primarily to Article III courts, but 
the relatively greater expertise of the Patent Office promised 
faster, cheaper, and more accurate decisions than those of 
generalist district judges and juries.13 Even more than the 
Federal Circuit, the agency had clear expertise in the science and 
technology of the inventions being patented as well as in the 
doctrinal details of patent law.14 
 
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 10.  See Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 763, 772 (2008) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the 
Federal Circuit has useful expertise in patent law, and that the Supreme Court 
benefits from having its views.”). However, judges appointed to the Federal 
Circuit have not always had patent or trademark law expertise. See Report 
Concerning the Nomination of Judges to the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 599, 603 [hereinafter Report 
Concerning Nominations] (lamenting the nominations to the Federal Circuit 
from its creation in 1982 to 1988 because “only one out of the seven nominees 
submitted to Congress in that period, Judge Newman, had patent expertise”). 
 11. See, e.g., Report Concerning Nominations, supra note 10, at 602 n.9 
(describing how Chief Judge Markey’s background as a patent lawyer helped the 
Federal Circuit address and resolve circuit splits on various patent law issues); 
id. at 603 n.11 (noting that Judge Nies was a trademark lawyer prior to his 
appointment to the bench but had had two years of patent experience as a judge 
on the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals).  
 12. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–307 (2018)) (allowing parties to request 
reexamination of patent claims based on prior art). 
 13. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing how reduced costs, 
expertise, and accuracy associated with Patent Office review influenced 
Congress in broadening the Patent Office’s review powers). 
 14. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2018) (requiring that “administrative patent 
judges shall be persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability”), 
with 28 U.S.C. § 44 note (Congressional Statement Regarding Appointment of 
Judges) (expressing the sense of the Congress merely that “qualified 
individuals” should be appointed to the Federal Circuit). 
1672 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2019) 
Subsequent enlargements of Patent Office power relied on 
the same claim of expertise, especially scientific expertise. The 
system of inter partes reexamination created in the 1999 
American Inventors Protection Act15 and the suite of trial-like 
administrative adjudications created in the 2011 America Invents 
Act all held up the agency’s expertise as a reason to empower it 
further. Indeed, the AIA in particular was explicitly 
substitutionary in ways that the preceding reexamination 
systems were not.16 The Patent Office did not only receive 
broader power, but now received that power at the expense of the 
courts. In many contexts, parties could choose one forum or the 
other, but either choice now foreclosed the other.17 Patent power 
became more of a zero-sum game, and expertise was the stated 
justification. 
The blinkered focus on expertise, however, has obscured until 
now, another important principle that animates the Patent 
Office’s claims to expansive power and does much to explain the 
agency’s behavior, even its initial success. That principle is the 
direct injection of politics and policy preferences into patent law. 
The Patent Office has suffered from a well-known history of being 
denied autonomy in matters of substantive patent law and policy. 
This history, which includes a lack of Chevron deference18 on 
legal matters and intrusive judicial review even on factual 
matters, set the agency apart from most of the modern 
administrative state.19 Meanwhile, the transformations that the 
AIA brought about were a sea change in the systemic role of the 
 
 15.  See Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4604, 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 567–70 (codified 
as amended in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319) (allowing for inter partes review of patent 
claims and setting forth procedures for such review). 
 16.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (allowing the Director of the Patent Office 
to prioritize a post-grant review while, among other things, staying or 
terminating other pending proceedings regarding the same patent). 
 17.  See id. § 325(a) (barring post-grant review by the Patent Office if the 
requesting party has already filed a civil action in the courts). 
 18. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842–44 (1984) (discussing the deference given by courts to “permissible 
constructions” by agencies of ambiguous statutes governing their actions). 
 19. See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1973 (noting that Chevron deference is 
warranted when an agency has “authority to engage in formal adjudication or 
rule making,” but “[u]nlike most notable agencies, the PTO lacks significant 
substantive rule-making authority”). 
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Patent Office. Legislative and academic opinion were focused on 
agency expertise,20 with no corresponding political account of 
agency power to impose principled limits, creating the 
opportunity for a clean break from past practice. 
The effects of this break are profound. The Patent Office 
stands to make considerable institutional gains from its 
aggrandizements. Foremost among these gains is the freedom to 
engage in structural and, eventually, substantive policymaking 
with little or no judicial competition from district courts or 
supervision from the Federal Circuit.21 Indeed, the initial balance 
in this power struggle is mixed but presently tips in the agency’s 
favor. At the same time, recent Patent Office practices inflict 
significant injury to stable property rights in the patent system, 
to the ability of Congress and of the agency itself to make credible 
commitments to innovators and consumers, and to the future of 
judicial safeguards in the patent system.22 If realized, the gains 
may be short-lived or not, but the injuries are likely to be 
long-lasting. 
To be sure, one may reasonably ask what is so fundamentally 
troubling about an administrative agency exercising political 
 
 20. For illustrative legislative discussion, see, for example, 157 CONG. REC. 
2,843 (2011) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar) (praising the AIA’s provisions 
allowing any third party to provide patent examiners with potentially relevant 
information because they could enhance the agency’s expertise); Crossing the 
Finish Line on Patent Reform: What Can and Should Be Done: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the Internet of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 15 (2011) (statement of David Simon, 
Associate General Counsel, Intel Corporation) (arguing that no limitations 
should be placed on the inter partes and ex parte review systems because 
limitations “will encourage immediate lawsuits on bad patents to avoid the 
expertise of the Office invalidating these patents”). For illustrative academic 
discussion, see Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1985 (lamenting that the D.C. 
Circuit has deferred to the expertise of the Patent Office instead of seizing on 
ambiguity to review agency proceedings); Ryan Whalen, Complex Innovation 
and the Patent Office, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 226, 262–64 (2017) 
(suggesting reforms to improve Patent Office efficiency, like opening up inter 
partes review by providing incentives that maximize the expertise of patent 
examiners). 
 21. See infra Part II.B (discussing how the Patent Office’s decision to 
institute review of patents is final and nonappealable). 
 22. See infra Part III.B (discussing the systemic harms caused by 
aggrandized agency power). 
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power and making policy in its own domain. Even the tendency of 
agencies to aggrandize their power is well-theorized and easy to 
identify precisely because this tendency is widespread. Why is 
Patent Office power different? 
For one thing, it is unlike decades-old regimes such as 
securities regulation or telecommunications that, at times, also 
present concerns of unchecked agency power. The revocation of 
patent rights through administrative trial proceedings under the 
AIA is only a few years old.23 The system’s current scale was 
much larger than predicted, its eventual scale still unknown, and 
its eventual reach still untested. For scholars and institutional 
designers who have been present at the creation, therefore, the 
best time to curb Patent Office aggrandizement is now, after 
detailed empirical information about the system and its effects 
has become available24—but before its more dubious precedents 
become too strongly entrenched to reverse. 
The other, more fundamental difference is that the Patent 
Office’s disempowered past is also its present. Though the agency 
may wish to move away from its past subordination to the 
Federal Circuit, Congress has made no such move. Patent law 
historically denied the Patent Office substantive rulemaking 
authority and the judicial deference that comes with it.25 
Congress considered proposals to change this in the AIA, but 
rejected them.26 Congress could have committed more of the 
 
 23. The AIA was enacted on September 16, 2011 but it took effect one year 
later. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 35, 125 Stat. 284, 
341 (2011). 
 24. See generally Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An 
Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014) (reporting an 
empirical study tracking the outcome of IPR proceedings two years after the 
effective date of the AIA); Matthew R. Frontz, Staying Litigation Pending Inter 
Partes Review and Effects on Patent Litigation, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 469 (2015) 
(discussing empirical data showing the effects of IPR on parallel federal court 
litigation); Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8 (presenting an empirical and 
analytical study of how litigants use IPR relative to parallel federal court 
litigation). 
 25.  See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1973 (“The PTO, however, has not 
historically possessed the authority to engage in formal adjudication or rule 
making—the two formal procedures that Mead indicates would likely warrant 
deference.” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001)). 
 26.  See 153 CONG. REC. H10,281 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of 
CONNECT) (“The existing rulemaking language in the bill is too expansive and 
gives the [Patent Office] unparalleled authority . . . . As such, we urge you to 
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administrative trial process to the agency’s discretion, but did not 
do so. What politically inflected powers the Patent Office did 
receive were specific and more limited than how it actually 
exercises those powers. For the agency now to try and squeeze 
elephants into these mouseholes is inappropriate. 
Given these likely systemic injuries and the unpersuasive 
counter-arguments that support the Patent Office’s conduct, a 
political explanation and evaluation of agency power that goes 
beyond expertise alone is necessary. This Article provides that 
explanation and evaluation, offering the first detailed critique of 
recent Patent Office aggrandizements to make policy in disguise. 
Part 0 details the offending practices. First, it traces the 
agency’s startling admissions about stacking administrative 
panels, inconsistent and shifting justifications for it, and the 
ways in which panel stacking has worked. Then it turns to the 
agency’s attempts to evade judicial review, first by colorably 
interpreting ambiguous nonappealability statutes and then by 
relying on early victories to stake out more implausible terrain. 
Part III evaluates the effects of these practices, identifying 
particular agency benefits as well as systemic harms. It also 
explores alternatives to judicial review for policing Patent Office 
excesses and concludes that these alternatives are ultimately 
inadequate. 
Building on these descriptive and normative premises, Part 
IV then explains how the Patent Office was able to engage in 
these successful and attempted expansions of its own power. It 
begins with the traditional account of expertise as the reason why 
power over patent validity should be reallocated from courts to 
the agency, finding this account incomplete. It continues with a 
discussion of politics and policy preferences as an increasingly 
salient explanation for Patent Office power, including even 
legislative indications that these values should, within limits, 
play a role in patent law. It turns next to a discussion of the 
 
follow the Senate’s lead and remove the PTO rulemaking provision from the 
House bill.”); id. at H23,958 (statement of Rep. Issa) (“But this amendment on 
rulemaking which would stop an arbitrary decision by the Patent Office on 
something it may want to do . . . is there for a reason. . . . [I]t is crucial for this 
amendment to get into it if we are going to protect against arbitrary action by 
the Patent and Trademark Office.”). 
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agency’s especially pernicious choice to commingle the separate 
powers of screening and adjudication, which Congress delegated 
separately in the AIA, in a single administrative decision-making 
body. It concludes with focal points for reforming the current 
system of disguised patent policymaking so that the validity of 
patent rights is adjudicated more coherently, and the Patent 
Office exercises its power in a more principled and accountable 
way. 
II. Agency Aggrandizement in Patent Law 
This Part discusses the two principal ways in which the 
Patent Office has exercised questionable power in its adjudicatory 
processes. Both have inappropriately displaced judicial authority, 
that of the U.S. district courts as well as the Federal Circuit, and 
both are best understood as political claims to power in the guise 
of technocratic administration. Part II.A discusses panel 
stacking, the practice of changing the makeup of certain Patent 
Office panels of administrative judges to reach desired outcomes. 
Parts II.B–D discuss a progression of related efforts by the Patent 
Office to insulate itself from judicial review in the Federal Circuit 
and from competition with the U.S. district courts for patent 
validity cases. 
A. Stacking Administrative Judge Panels 
The systematic push to enlarge Patent Office power in 
administrative adjudication, free from judicial interference, is a 
phenomenon in progress.27 The first and most troubling symptom 
of this enlargement is a pattern of opaquely political Patent 
Office decision-making. In cases where USPTO leadership has 
been dissatisfied with an administrative panel’s initial decision, 
the agency’s practice has been to reconfigure the panel with 
additional agency judges and rehear the case to produce a more 
 
 27. See Greg Reilly, Bridging the Gap Between the Federal Courts and the 
Patent & Trademark Office: The Journal of Science and Technology Law 
Symposium: The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Litigation, 23 B.U. 
J. SCI. & TECH. 377, 379 (discussing the expansion of the Patent Office’s power 
after Congress passed the America Invents Act). 
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desirable outcome. Though the impropriety of changing an 
adjudicatory tribunal’s composition for result-oriented reasons is 
intuitive, the particular benefits that the agency seems to see for 
itself through this approach are less obvious,28 and the particular 
systemic harms that result are bound up with the structural 
details of the agency’s patent validity review system.29 
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board is the Patent Office unit 
that hears administrative challenges to patent validity, whether 
inter partes review (IPR), covered business method review, or 
post-grant review.30 These three types of proceedings were 
established by the AIA to provide a more vigorous reevaluation of 
the validity of patents that the agency has already issued.31 Due 
to a number of institutional and structural factors, the initial 
review that patent applications receive from agency examiners 
tends, in close cases, to err on the side more of granting 
undeserving patents than of denying deserving ones.32 
 
 28.  See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the agency’s attempts to argue that 
its authority to stack panels to achieve coherent policy earns it Chevron 
deference). 
 29.  See infra Part III.B (discussing the harms caused by the Patent Office’s 
aggrandizement of power, including the destabilization of patent property 
rights). 
 30.  35 U.S.C. §§ 316(c), 326(c) (2018). 
 31.  See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 51 (“The importance of 
error correction remains a dominant theme in ex post patent review . . . .”). 
 32.  This is the subject of a wide-ranging analytical and empirical 
literature. For representative discussions of the analytical issues, see generally 
Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990 (2013) 
(examining the presumption of patentability employed by patent examiners); 
Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011) (discussing the 
incentives that the Patent Office has in granting patents because grants cannot 
be appealed by any party other than the patent applicant); Melissa F. 
Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive 
Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379 (2011) (arguing that the Federal Circuit is 
pressured to announce broad legal standards when the Patent Office itself 
expands patentability standards); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the 
Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001) (arguing that patent examiners do 
not thoroughly vet patents in part because of a strain on resource). For 
representative empirical discussions, see generally Michael D. Frakes & Melissa 
F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many 
Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613 (2015) 
(presenting empirical findings that the Patent Office is biased toward granting 
patents); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding 
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Meanwhile, correcting patent errors through the federal courts is 
perceived to be unduly costly, protracted, prone to error, and hard 
to access due to Article III standing and the declaratory judgment 
cause of action, among other constraints.33 The AIA review 
proceedings allow these issues to be resolved in adversarial 
litigation before administrative patent judges who must be 
“persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability”34—
 i.e., who must understand both the technological details of 
patented inventions and the doctrinal details of patent law. 
In hearing cases challenging patent validity, the PTAB must 
sit in panels of “at least 3 members.”35 The Director and Deputy 
Director of the Patent Office as well as the Commissioners for 
Patents and Trademarks are, by statute, members of the PTAB in 
addition to the administrative patent judges themselves.36 The 
power to grant rehearing rests exclusively in the PTAB, and the 
power to designate members of a PTAB panel belongs to the 
Director.37 
Thus, expanding a panel for a rehearing seems, on first 
impression, to be within the power of the Director, who is a 
member of the PTAB and is empowered to designate members of 
a PTAB panel. Yet a series of cases has revealed both the 
questionable way in which the Patent Office actually exercises 
these powers and the agency’s shifting justifications for its 
practice. The agency first confirmed its result-oriented panel 
stacking during a December 2015 oral argument in the Yissum38 
case: 
 
Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting 
Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2013) (presenting empirical findings that suggest 
the Patent Office’s fee structure creates financial incentives for granting 
patents). 
 33. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 50–64 (summarizing 
the evolving preference in U.S. patent law for administrative, rather than 
judicial, error-correction). 
 34.  35 U.S.C. § 6(a).  
 35.  Id. § 6(c) (emphasis added). 
 36.  Id. § 6(a). 
 37.  Id. § 6(c). 
 38.  Yissum Research Dev. Co. of The Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Sony 
Corp., 626 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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Judge Taranto: And, anytime there has been a 
seeming other outlier, you’ve 
engaged the power to reconfigure 
the panel so as to get the result 
you want? 
Patent Office: Yes, your Honor. 
Judge Taranto: And, you don’t see a problem with 
that? 
Patent Office: Your Honor, the Director is trying 
to ensure that her policy position 
is being enforced by the panels.39 
The motivation to implement policy preferences through 
adjudication rather than through rulemaking is not itself 
problematic, especially as the Patent Office lacks substantive 
rulemaking authority.40 To the extent that Congress has 
empowered the agency to “speak with the force of law”41 through 
formal adjudicatory authority, incremental policymaking through 
adjudication may be not only permissible, but preferable. The 
propriety of doing so by changing a panel’s composition, however, 
is not as clear, as Judge Taranto’s subsequent questions in 
Yissum suggest: 
Judge Taranto: The Director is not given 
adjudicatory authority, right, 
under § 6 of the statute? That 
gives it to the Board. 
 
 39.  Oral Argument at 47:20, Yissum, 626 F. App’x 1006 (Nos. 
2015-1342, -1343), https://perma.cc/H3SL-BX5Q (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 40.  See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(explaining that 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) “does NOT grant the Commissioner the 
authority to issue substantive rules”). 
 41. See, e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) 
(quoting Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981)). See generally 
Wasserman, supra note 1, for an excellent overview of the Patent Office’s 
historical inability to speak with the force of law and the changes that the AIA 
made in that regard by creating adjudications arguably formal enough to merit 
judicial deference. 
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Patent Office: Right. To clarify, the Director is a 
member of the Board, but your 
Honor is correct— 
Judge Taranto: But after the panel is chosen, I’m 
not sure I see the authority there 
to engage in case-specific 
re-adjudication from the Director 
after the panel has been selected. 
Patent Office: That’s correct, once the panel has 
been set, it has the adjudicatory 
authority and the— 
Judge Taranto: Until, in your view, it’s reset by 
adding a few members who will 
come out the other way? 
Patent Office: That’s correct, your Honor. We 
believe that’s what Alappat 
holds.42 
The agency’s reliance on the 1994 In re Alappat43 decision is 
notable, as the Patent Office in that case survived a challenge to 
a similar practice of expanding a panel of the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI).44 The BPAI was the 
predecessor of the PTAB and differed in important ways, making 
Alappat distinguishable from the present context. The more basic 
weakness of relying on Alappat, however, is that the Federal 
Circuit did not actually address the due process challenge in that 
case, but merely dismissed it as waived.45 That the due process 
concerns associated with panel stacking remain a live issue and 
raise serious questions about the rule of law became clear during 
another oral argument, this time in the Wi-Fi One46 case: 
 
 42. Oral Argument in Yissum, supra note 39, at 47:41. 
 43.  33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 44. See id. at 1531–36 (holding that the former 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988) granted 
the Commissioner of the BPAI the authority to designate the members of a 
panel and expand a panel). 
 45. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1536 (determining that Alappat had 
waived his due process argument against re-designation of the panel because he 
acquiesced to the BPAI Commissioner’s actions). 
 46. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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Judge Wallach:  The situation I described to your 
esteemed colleague where, in 
effect, the Director puts his or her 
thumb on the outcome —
 shenanigan or not? It’s within the 
written procedures. 
Patent Office: So, your hypothetical is the 
Director stacks the Board? 
Judge Wallach: Yeah, more than a hypothetical. 
It happens all the time. It’s a 
request for reconsideration with a 
larger panel. 
Patent Office: That’s within the Director’s 
authority. The makeup of the 
Board to review the petition is 
within the Director’s authority. 
Whether that rises to the level of 
shenanigans or not— 
Judge Wallach: Aren’t there fundamental rule of 
law questions there, basic things 
like predictability and uniformity 
and transparency of judgments 
and neutrality of decision 
makers? And don’t we review that 
kind of thing?47 
Indeed, these rule of law concerns are of a piece with Federal 
Circuit unease about other peculiarities in the PTAB’s practices, 
such as selecting certain meritorious portions of petitions for 
review, denying other portions as being “redundant,” and 
claiming absolute immunity from judicial review or even from 
explaining the contours of a “doctrine of redundancy.”48 Writing 
 
 47.  Oral Argument at 26:37, Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d 1364 (Nos. 
2015-1944, -1945, -1946), https://perma.cc/KH7G-Y756 (last visited Sept. 2, 
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 48. See generally Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Non-Doctrine of 
Redundancy, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777 (2019) (discussing the Patent Office 
practice of denying requests for review because it believes they are redundant 
and highlighting problems with this practice). 
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separately in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel, 
Systems, Inc.,49 for example, Judge Reyna concluded in that 
context that the claim of the Patent Office “to unchecked 
discretionary authority is unprecedented.”50 
The Patent Office then replied more cautiously when pressed 
about panel stacking during the June 2017 oral argument in the 
Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.51 case: 
Judge Reyna: What kind of uniformity or certainty 
do we have in that where the PTAB 
can look at a prior decision and say, 
“Well we don’t like that, let’s jump 
back in there and change that?” 
Patent Office: Well— 
Judge Wallach: How does the Director choose which 
judge to assign to expand the panel? 
Patent Office: That’s provided, your Honor, by our 
standard operating procedure. And, 
the Chief Judge actually makes that 
decision. And, the judges are selected 
based on their technical and legal 
competency. And, over the years, 
many, many panels at the Board 
have been expanded. In fact if you 
looked at the thirty— 
Judge Reyna: Are they selected on whether they’re 
going to rule in a certain way? 
Patent Office: Well, people can be placed on the 
panel—for example, the Director can 
place him- or herself on the panel, 
and certainly the Director knows how 
they’re going to rule. Nidec has not 
said—and they say at their blue brief 
at page 43 that they don’t challenge 
the independence of these judges on 
 
 49. 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016), abrogated by Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d 1364 
(Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 50. Shaw Industries Group, 817 F.3d at 1303 (Reyna, J., concurring). 
 51. 868 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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this panel. These judges were not 
selected and told to make a 
particular decision. If judges could be 
told to make a particular decision, 
there would be no need to expand a 
panel in the first place.52 
The agency’s assurance of decisional independence for its 
administrative judges is, indeed, quite important and would do 
much to reduce concerns about “predictability and uniformity and 
transparency of judgments and neutrality of decision makers.”53 
However, this account rings hollow in light of the repeated 
panel stacking in Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp.54 In 
that case, the original panel consisted, as usual, of three judges.55 
As the decision drew near, the PTAB on its own initiative 
expanded the panel to five judges to avoid an anticipated 
unsatisfactory outcome by the three-judge panel.56 The PTAB’s 
standard operating procedure for panel stacking provides for 
exactly this sort of sua sponte expansion.57 The panel need not 
await a request for rehearing: the choice to expand may come 
before a decision by the current panel.58 
 
 52. Oral Argument at 25:27, Nidec, 868 F.3d 1013 (No. 2016-2321), 
https://perma.cc/4Y89-S4RJ (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53.  Oral Argument in Wi-fi One, supra note 47, at 26:37. 
 54.  No. IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2014). 
 55.  See Order on Conduct of the Proceeding, Target, No. IPR2014-00508, 
Paper 4 (recounting a conference call regarding the briefing schedule between 
counsel for the parties and the three administrative patent judges assigned to 
the case). 
 56. See Decision Denying Motion for Joinder, Target, No. IPR2014-00508, 
Paper 18 (denying petitioner Target Corporation’s motion for joinder by a vote of 
3–2). 
 57. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL 
BOARD STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 1 (REVISION 15) 1–2 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/74CA-C48R (PDF) (“This [Standard Operating Procedure] does 
not limit the authority of the Director to designate, de-designate, or otherwise 
alter in any way at any time, panels . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 58. See id. at 16 (“When an expanded panel is designated (1) after a case 
initially has been assigned to a panel and (2) before a decision is entered by the 
panel, the judges initially designated shall be designated, if available, as part of 
the expanded panel.”). 
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But in Target, the plan failed at first. Even the expanded 
five-judge panel reached what the agency leadership considered 
the wrong outcome.59 The only way this could have happened, of 
course, was that all three judges originally on the panel had been 
planning to rule this way in light of the evidence and argument. 
Indeed, this is just what happened. The PTAB added two judges 
to the panel, apparently hoping to sway one of the original three 
and thus produce a 3–2 decision going the other way. None of the 
three were swayed, however, and the result was a 3–2 decision 
that frustrated the agency’s first, preemptive attempt at panel 
stacking.60 
Granting rehearing over the objection of the three original 
judges,61 the PTAB added yet another two judges to the panel, for 
a total of seven, so that a 4–3 decision that was satisfactory to the 
agency leadership could be assured.62 Even then, the three judges 
on the original panel, finally outnumbered, still issued a dissent 
adhering to their original position63 just as they had dissented 
from the re-stacked panel’s order granting rehearing at all.64 
The sum of these illustrations of Patent Office panel stacking 
is that the ostensibly neutral and independent adjudicatory 
process that the AIA put in place has been overlaid with a system 
of adjustments and distortions that are much more 
outcome-driven in nature and much more beholden to the 
agency’s political hierarchy than a narrative of impartial 
technocracy might suggest. What the Patent Office might stand 
to gain from panel stacking — notably, but not exclusively, 
Chevron deference — is discussed below,65 as are the systemic 
 
 59.  Decision Denying Joinder, supra note 56. 
 60. Id. 
 61.  See Decision Granting Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing, Target, No. 
IPR2014-00508, Paper 28 (granting rehearing—with the original three judges 
dissenting). 
 62. Decision Granting Joinder, supra note 56. 
 63.  See id. at 7 (dissenting opinion) (arguing briefly that 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) 
(2018) does not authorize joinder of proceedings and citing their dissenting 
opinion in Paper 28). 
 64. See Decision Granting Rehearing, supra note 61, at 1 (dissenting 
opinion) (arguing that the majority essentially “convert[ed] a statutory bar to 
inter partes review into a discretionary bar” not subject to review). 
 65. See infra Part III.A (discussing how the PTAB has sought Chevron 
deference by arguing that its panel stacking authority is evidence that it has the 
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costs that the practice might impose66 and the analytical reasons 
why the agency might plausibly think itself authorized to decide 
cases this way at all.67 The more immediate lesson is that the 
details of panel stacking reveal an admitted pattern of Patent 
Office policymaking in the guise of adjudication, and a desire to 
implement political judgments using a process built on the 
rhetoric of the agency’s technical expertise. 
B. Resisting Review of Case Selection 
Panel stacking reflects an enlargement of Patent Office 
power that has unfolded primarily inside the agency (though 
later implications like Chevron deference do look outward to the 
judiciary). At the same time, the Patent Office has also directly 
aggrandized itself in the courts, on the issue of judicial review 
itself, through a series of procedural choices that push beyond the 
text and structure of the AIA. The Supreme Court approved one 
of these choices in 2016, as this Part discusses.68 The en banc 
Federal Circuit disapproved a second in early 2018, as Part II.C 
explains next.69 The third and most recent just failed in the 
Supreme Court, creating considerable disruption in PTAB 
administration, as Part II.D addresses.70 These attempted 
aggrandizements mark a significant shift away from the court-
agency allocation of power that Congress put in place through the 
AIA. 
 
power to speak consistently). 
 66.  See infra Part III.B (arguing that panel stacking hurts due process, 
undermines stability of patent property rights, and prevents meaningful judicial 
oversight). 
 67.  See infra Part IV (discussing how the PTAB interpreted congressional 
delegations of power overbroadly). 
 68.  See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016) 
(concluding that 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) bars judicial review of the PTAB’s decision to 
institute IPR). 
 69.  See Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 
(concluding that time-bar determinations under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) are 
appealable). 
 70.  See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (holding that partial 
institution of inter partes review (e.g., reviewing some claims while not 
reviewing others) is outside the PTAB’s authority).  
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The first of the Patent Office’s efforts at insulating itself from 
judicial scrutiny of PTAB review was in the context of evaluating 
PTAB petitions for merit and deciding whether even to proceed 
with review. This was a natural starting point because the AIA 
itself gives the Patent Office some discretion to screen cases and, 
importantly, makes those discretionary determinations “final and 
nonappealable.”71 The eventual dispute on this issue would turn 
on the scope and extent of this discretion and of the insulation of 
screening-related decisions from judicial review. 
In the early days of AIA reviews, particularly inter partes 
review, the PTAB quickly received a reputation for allowing a 
large majority of petitions to proceed through the screening phase 
and into merits adjudication.72 Among petitions for inter partes 
review, the PTAB granted review as to at least one challenged 
claim in the patent for eighty-four percent of petitions.73 Among 
those petitions that the PTAB selected, the eventual rate of 
patent cancellation was also quite high: one early estimate found 
that in seventy-seven percent of cases that reached a final 
decision on the merits, all of the disputed claims in the patent 
were invalidated.74 
 
 71.  35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (nonappealability of inter partes review); id. § 324(e) 
(nonappealability of post-grant review). 
 72.  See, e.g., R. David Donoghue, 3 Benefits of Parallel District Court 
Litigation and IPR, LAW360 (June 9, 2014, 10:21 AM), 
https://perma.cc/2KEX-VL8Q (last visited Sept. 22, 2019) (noting that, as of 
early 2014, approximately eighty-four percent of inter partes review petitions 
were instituted) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Tony Dutra, 
Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform Bill, BNA 
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Oct. 29, 2013), https://perma.cc/4H96-
QWFR  (last visited Sept. 22, 2019) (recounting the opinion of former Federal 
Circuit Chief Judge Rader that PTAB judges are “acting as death squads, killing 
property rights”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Claims 
Can Survive Inter Partes and Covered Business Method Review (But Few Do), 
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP (Apr. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/W78C-32KV (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2019) (arguing that the PTAB is “where patent claims go to die”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Gregory Dolin, Dubious 
Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 926–27 (2015) (arguing that the PTAB 
makes it “too easy to invalidate a duly issued patent”). 
 73. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 78 (citing a study by 
Love &  Ambwani, supra note 24, at 100). 
 74. See Love & Ambwani, supra note 24, at 94 (“Among IPRs that reach a 
final decision on the merits, all instituted claims are invalidated or disclaimed 
more than 77 percent of the time . . . .”). 
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The latter finding was to be expected. The PTAB’s legal 
criterion for selecting cases is a sufficient likelihood that at least 
one of the challenged claims of the patent will successfully be 
invalidated.75 Thus, it stands to reason that cases actually 
selected for review will tend to reflect outcomes in that direction. 
The former finding, however—a high rate of acceptance 
through the screening process itself—was less self-evident. One 
possibility was that the set of patents that petitioners would 
initially be expected to challenge in the PTAB were subject to 
selection effects.76 For example, this is true of disputes that 
parties litigate in court rather than resolve by settlement.77 On 
this view, the early cohort of patents that petitioners chose to 
challenge, especially in inter partes review, were low-hanging 
fruit and unusually vulnerable to invalidation.78 
Another important source of the PTAB’s observed leniency in 
screening petitions, however, was its lax interpretation of the 
requirement that a petition must identify each of its challenges 
with “particularity.”79 Controversy arose over this interpretation 
 
 75.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), 324(a) (2018) (requiring the Director to 
determine that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would 
prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” before 
instituting review). 
 76. See Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 719, 756 (2016) (hypothesizing that because patents tested in the PTAB 
“crucible” are weaker and more likely to be invalidated, “the high percentage of 
invalidation at the PTAB indicates nothing other than selection bias”). 
 77.  See generally George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of 
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (theorizing that the 
determinants of whether to litigate are solely economic, and demonstrating that, 
all economic conditions being equal, plaintiffs can expect about a fifty percent 
rate of success). 
 78.  See Jarrad Wood & Jonathan R. K. Stroud, Three Hundred Nos: An 
Empirical Analysis of the First 300+ Denials of Institution for Inter Partes and 
Covered Business Method Patent Reviews Prior to In re Cuozzo Speed 
Technologies, LLC, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 112, 141–42 (2015) 
(citing Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially 
Viable Patents Invalid?, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 24, 2014), 
https://perma.cc/QB2J-3SQN (last visited Sept. 3, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review)) (“As some practitioners conjecture, perhaps 
the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of particularly problematic patents may grow scarce in 
years to come, further depressing these percentages.”). 
 79.  See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring that a petition must identify, “in 
writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the 
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because the Patent Office did not merely claim the power to 
screen and select cases without judicial interference at the time of 
screening. Rather, the agency argued that its screening was not 
subject to judicial supervision at any time, even after a final 
agency action.80 Two competing views arose about the propriety of 
this interpretation. 
One view was that the nonappealability of the decision 
whether to institute review meant merely that a litigant, 
particularly an aggrieved patent owner who was being drawn into 
a review proceeding, could not obtain an interlocutory appeal of 
the agency’s decision to proceed.81 In other words, a patent 
owner’s right not to be subjected to an unmeritorious patent 
validity challenge was not protected by the courts. Indeed, if such 
a “right not to stand trial” existed, then by definition it would 
have to be redressed up front through interlocutory review or not 
at all. 
However, review would remain available later of all issues, 
on the basic administrative law principle that intermediate issues 
merge into an agency’s final order on the merits.82 This would 
include review of screening-related decisions that may have 
overlapped analytically with the adjudication of merits or that 
may have implicated statutory limits on the agency’s authority.83 
 
challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for 
the challenge to each claim” (emphasis added)). 
 80.  See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 6, Cuozzo Speed Techs., 
LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) (No. 15-446), 2015 WL 8621635, at *6 
(arguing that “because § 314(d) is unnecessary to limit interlocutory appeals, it 
must be read to bar review of all institution decisions, even after the Board 
issues a final decision.”). 
 81.  See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The stated purpose of the ‘final and 
nonappealable’ provision is to control interlocutory delay and harassing 
filings.”); Brief for the Petitioner at 46, Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (No. 15-446), 
2016 WL 737452, at *46. A petitioner to whom the PTAB had denied review 
was, of course, similarly unable to appeal the unfavorable decision, but strictly 
speaking, such a review would not have been interlocutory; the decision not to 
proceed would have been a final agency action otherwise subject to judicial 
review. 
 82.  See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (“[T]he 
issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe is a step toward, and will 
merge in, the Commission’s decision on the merits.”). 
 83.  See Brief for the Petitioner, Cuozzo, supra note 81, at 46–48 (discussing 
the justifications for the types of issues that may be subject to reviewability). 
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For a petitioner who was incorrectly denied review, meanwhile, 
there would be no distinction between interlocutory or final 
judgment review.84 The PTAB decision not to proceed would 
simply end the case with no appeal.85 
The other, more expansive view was that the 
nonappealability of the PTAB’s screening decision barred more 
than just interlocutory review: the screening decision was 
unreviewable even after a final decision by the PTAB on the 
merits of the case.86 In defending the PTAB’s practice, this latter 
expansive position was the view of agency power that the Patent 
Office took before the Federal Circuit.87 It remained the view of 
agency power that the Solicitor General, in coordination with the 
Patent Office, took before the Supreme Court.88 
The upshot of the agency’s argument was not only to 
immunize itself from immediate judicial interference with the 
PTAB’s actual decision to proceed with a review or not.89 That 
much the statute itself unambiguously provided.90 The agency’s 
approach also immunized it from judicial scrutiny of additional 
legal issues related to the screening process, including express 
statutory limits on the circumstances under which a petition 
“may be considered” at all by the agency,91 like the requirement 
 
 84.  See id. at 46 (“Once the Board institutes IPR, it invalidates more than 
four out of every five patent claims that reach a final decision.”). 
 85.  See id. at 46 (“In a real sense, the Board’s decision whether to institute 
IPR is the most critical stage of the proceeding.”). 
 86. See In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1273 (concluding that “§ 314(d) prohibits 
review of the decision to institute IPR even after a final decision”). 
 87.  See Brief for Intervenor-Director of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office at 30–33, In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d 1268 (No. 2014-1301), 2016 
WL 737452, at *26 (taking the position that “[the PTAB’s decision], by statute, 
is ‘final and nonappealable,’ so [the] Court lacks the jurisdiction to consider it”). 
 88.  See Brief for the Respondent at 44–50, Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (No. 
15-446), 2016 WL 1165967, at *34 (maintaining a broad view of the agency’s 
discretion over the decision). 
     89.  See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2018) (“The determination by the Director 
whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and 
nonappealable.”). 
 90.  Id.  
 91. See id. § 312(a) (describing the situations in which a petition “may be 
considered”). 
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that such consideration was available “only if” the petition 
satisfied the particularity requirement.92 
The Supreme Court in Cuozzo v. Lee ultimately ruled in favor 
of the Patent Office, concluding that the particularity 
requirement was merely an ordinary element of the screening of 
petitions, and its analytical proximity to the screening decision 
swept this legal question into the ambit of unreviewable agency 
discretion.93 The Court majority in Cuozzo also expressed concern 
that allowing eventual judicial review over agency enforcement of 
the particularity requirement would hamper the ability of the 
Patent Office to “revisit and revise earlier patent grants” 
efficiently.94 
Although the Court’s concern about efficient reevaluation of 
patent validity was well founded, it is questionable whether 
vindicating that concern required the far-reaching outcome in 
Cuozzo. For example, the more modest view of nonappealability, 
as a bar on interlocutory review, would also have protected PTAB 
adjudications from disruptive scrutiny.95 The Federal Circuit 
would not have been able to step in before the PTAB had a chance 
to conduct its review of the merits in a case. Eventual review of 
the initial screening decision may, at the margin, have allowed a 
final agency decision to “be unwound under some minor statutory 
technicality.”96 Still, the Court seemed not to appreciate that this 
sort of problem would likely arise only in early appellate 
reversals.97 The agency would learn quickly—indeed, would be 
forced to learn quickly—from these unwindings and would 
conform to its supervising court’s precedents. 
 
 92. See id. § 312(a)(3) (“[T]he petition identifies, in writing and with 
particularity, each claim challenged . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 93.  See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016) 
(explaining that “the legal dispute at issue is an ordinary dispute about the 
application of certain relevant patent statutes concerning the Patent Office’s 
decision to institute inter partes review”). 
 94. See id. at 2139–40 (“[A] contrary holding would undercut one important 
congressional objective, namely, giving the Patent Office significant power to 
revisit and revise earlier patent grants.”). 
 95.  See id. at 2151 (Alito, J., dissenting) (interpreting the word 
“nonappealable” narrowly). 
 96.  Id. at 2140. 
 97.  See id. at 2140–42 (discussing the danger that appealability presents 
for the functioning of the Patent Office). 
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Ultimately, the Court’s desire not to undercut the important 
legislative objective of efficient patent validity reevaluation 
proved too much. By this reasoning, which Justice Alito 
articulated in dissent, the Court could “do away with judicial 
review whenever [it thought] that review makes it harder for an 
agency to carry out important work.”98 Congress did give the 
Patent Office significant new power to reevaluate patent validity, 
but also prescribed certain means and proscribed certain others 
in reaching that objective.99 
Finally, the Court’s conception of the actual relationship 
between screening and adjudication repays close scrutiny.100 In 
response to the argument that the Patent Office had improperly 
accepted a petition that was not pled with the necessary 
particularity, the Court concluded that complaints regarding the 
quality or adequacy of evidence (i.e., issues related to 
adjudicating the merits of an argument) “can always be recast as 
a complaint that the . . . presentation was incomplete or 
misleading” (i.e., recast as issues related to screening the viability 
of an argument).101 In other words, the Court recognized that 
screening the likely viability of a petition and adjudicating its 
merits overlap considerably, and the danger of sweeping 
adjudication-related issues into the domain of screening is real, 
with the availability of judicial review at stake.102 However, 
rather than err prudently on the side of judicial oversight as the 
presumption of reviewability would counsel,103 the Court took 
otherwise reviewable adjudication-related issues and placed them 
 
 98.  Id. at 2151 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 99.  See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (recounting that “no legislation pursues its 
purposes at all costs” (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 
(1987) (per curiam))). 
 100.  See id. at 2140–42 (discussing the relationship between screening and 
adjudication). 
 101.  Id. at 2142 (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54 (1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 102.  See id. (recognizing that adjudicatory and screening concerns often 
overlap in issues relating to the review of the Patent Office’s determinations). 
 103.  See id. at 2150 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If a provision can reasonably be 
read to permit judicial review, it should be.”). 
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alongside screening-related issues, beyond the ability of courts to 
discipline.104 
On its own terms, the Cuozzo opinion reflected potential 
limits on how much unreviewable discretion the Patent Office 
actually has. Review may still be available, or not, for appeals 
that (1) “implicate constitutional questions,” (2) “depend on other 
less closely related statutes,” or (3) “present other questions of 
interpretation that reach, in terms of scope and impact, well 
beyond [the nonappealability statute].”105 Still, the practical 
reach of the Cuozzo decision remains unclear. How analytically 
separable from the institution decision can a statutory provision 
be and still be treated as a screening-related issue that the courts 
cannot review? 
C. Resisting Review of Statutory Boundaries 
The first substantial answer to this question came from a 
decision of the en banc Federal Circuit about another statutory 
limit on the power of the Patent Office to reevaluate patent 
validity. The case, Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.,106 
pertained to the one-year time limit within which a defendant 
who is charged in a civil action with infringing a patent must 
bring a petition for inter partes review of that patent or else forgo 
agency adjudication entirely.107 
The one-year time bar at issue in Wi-Fi One was an apt test 
of how far the Court’s logic in Cuozzo could extend in practice. 
Like the particularity requirement at issue in Cuozzo itself,108 the 
one-year time bar could be understood possibly as a 
 
 104.  See id. at 2150–53 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the ramifications of 
the Court’s rejection of the presumption of reviewability). 
 105. See id. at 2141 (outlining the instances in which application of the 
Court’s interpretation of the statute is not necessarily warranted). 
 106.  878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (rehearing en banc). 
 107.  See id. at 1367; see also 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2018) (“An inter partes 
review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed 
more than 1 year after the date on which [the party] is served with a complaint 
alleging infringement of the patent.”). 
 108.  See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016) 
(highlighting the “applicable patent law requirements” for the purposes of 
review). 
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screening-related issue beyond the reach of judicial review.109 It 
could also, more properly, be understood as an analytically 
distinct statutory limit on the agency’s power to adjudicate patent 
validity — power that is, indeed, subject to judicial review. The 
Federal Circuit’s own precedent on the question treated the 
one-year time bar as unreviewable.110 The Patent Office agreed 
and sought to follow its success in Cuozzo with even broader 
scope for nonappealability.111 
The en banc question presented was whether to overrule the 
governing panel precedent.112 A decisive 9–4 majority did 
overrule it, holding that the PTAB’s application of the one-year 
time bar is, indeed, subject to judicial review.113 
The dispute in Wi-Fi One implicated an important distinction 
between screening PTAB petitions and adjudicating them.114 The 
availability of administrative review in the Patent Office as a 
substitute for federal-court litigation has direct effects both on 
individual case outcomes and on the patent system more 
generally.115 It was necessary, therefore, for the Federal Circuit to 
 
 109.  See Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1371 (acknowledging the panel’s view in 
holding the time-bar challenges to be unreviewable). 
 110. See Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (holding that the statute “prohibits this court from reviewing the 
Board’s determination to initiate IPR proceedings based on its assessment of the 
time-bar of [the statute]”).   
 111. See Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1373 (weighing the merits of “the PTO’s 
position that the time-bar determination is unreviewable”). 
 112. See id. at 1367 (asking whether the court should overrule Achates and 
hold that judicial review is available for a patent owner to challenge the PTO’s 
determination). 
 113.  See id. at 1367 (holding that the time-bar determinations under the 
statute are appealable, overruling Achates). 
 114.  The arguments summarized in this Part are more fully developed in a 
related article. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Porous Court-Agency Border in 
Patent Law, 51 AKRON L. REV. 1069 (2018) [hereinafter Porous Court-Agency 
Border] (analyzing the “weakening border” between administrative and judicial 
reviewability) These arguments are also further developed in an amicus curiae 
brief filed in the Wi-Fi One case itself. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of 
Patent and Administrative Law in Support of Neither Party, Wi-Fi One, 878 
F.3d 1364 (Nos. 15-1944, 15-1945, 15-1946) [hereinafter Professors’ Amicus 
Brief in Wi-Fi] (discussing the development of reviewability in the realm of 
PTAB determinations). 
 115.  See Porous Court-Agency Border, supra note 114, at 1090–92 
(discussing the possible ramifications of the Wi-Fi One decision). 
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take into account these effects of Patent Office validity reviews 
because the Court in Cuozzo had emphasized these sorts of 
functional considerations in deciding whether judicial review is 
available.116 Indeed, the substitution of Patent Office proceedings 
for the traditional modes of federal court resolution was not 
merely Congress’s intended use for the AIA.117 It is also the result 
actually observed in practice. 
Litigants use inter partes review and covered business 
method review as strategic substitutes for litigation in two 
important ways.118 One is the standard model of substitution, in 
which a defendant sued in district court for infringing a patent 
brings a petition in the agency to challenge that patent.119 In 
contrast to this defensive posture is the nonstandard model of 
substitution, in which a party brings a preemptive challenge 
against a patent on which it has not yet been sued.120 Litigants 
use each form of substitution differently, with variation across 
technology and other factors.121 These differences also rest in 
significant part on statutory boundaries that the AIA drew 
between courts and the Patent Office.122 The one-year time bar of 
§ 315(b) is one of the most important of these boundaries, which 
 
 116.  See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141 (distancing the Court’s decision on the 
issue of particularity from other legal issues based on their potential “scope and 
impact”). 
 117.  See Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (rehearing en banc) (O’Malley, C.J., concurring) (highlighting that 
Congress chose to afford patent owners with the “important procedural right” of 
“judicial review of erroneous determinations by the PTO”).  
 118.  See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 64–77. (noting that 
litigants use post-grant review in essentially the same ways, to a lesser but 
growing extent); see also generally Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Youngest Patent 
Validity Proceeding: Evaluating Post-Grant Review, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
333, 335 (2016) [hereinafter Youngest Patent Validity Proceeding] (evaluating 
the institutional features of “ex post patent validity review in the administrative 
agency setting of the USPTO”). 
 119.  See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 49 (outlining efficiency 
as a major normative argument for administrative ex post review). 
 120.  See id. (delineating the two common scenarios in which patent 
challenges are brought). 
 121.  See id. (surveying the methods that petitions use standard and 
non-standard substitution). 
 122.  See Porous Court-Agency Border, supra note 114, at 1075 (“By the time 
of the AIA’s enactment, however, Congress was prepared to shape the border 
between courts and the Patent Office more actively . . . .”). 
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force a choice between seeking administrative review or 
proceeding in an Article III court.123 
As to degrees of usage, standard petitioners account for a 
large majority (seventy percent) of those who seek inter partes 
review.124 Similarly, among all the patents being challenged in 
PTAB review, a large majority (eighty-seven percent) are also 
simultaneously being asserted in court litigation.125 Meanwhile, 
the thirty percent of those seeking inter partes review who are 
nonstandard petitioners nevertheless constitute a substantial 
minority.126 Of particular salience to these different levels of use 
between standard and nonstandard petitioning is coordination 
among those who mount administrative patent challenges.127 The 
nature of their coordination reveals that the Patent Office is the 
locus of significant collective action in a way that courts have long 
been unable to achieve.128 
Because a patent invalidation judgment in court renders the 
patented invention free not only to the successful challenger but 
to all others,129 even those would-be free riders who did not 
contribute to the challenge, such judgments become a type of 
public good.130 Meanwhile, those who are positioned to mount 
 
 123.  See id. (discussing the various avenues through which Congress 
actively engaged in delineating the line between the Patent Office and the 
courts). 
 124.  See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 73 (“[T]he majority 
(70%) of IPR petitioners have previously been defendants in district court 
litigations involving the patents they now challenge.”). 
 125.  See id. at 69 (“[A]bout 86.8% of IPR- or CBM-challenged patents are 
also being litigated in the federal courts.”). 
 126.  See id. at 73 (outlining “the remaining 30% of cases” in which 
petitioners are not prior defendants). 
 127.  See id. at 74–75 (discussing the possible social and juridical 
repercussions of “collective action” as a method to challenge invalid patents). 
 128.  See id. (noting the explicit mission of certain organizations to bring 
collective challenges to patents in the Patent Office). 
 129. See Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 
(1971) (stating that res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses 
available to be plead in patent claims). 
 130.  See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage 
Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 687–88 (2004) 
(assessing the aftermath of the Blonder-Tongue holding and the possibility that 
the rule “turns patent invalidity judgements into public goods”). 
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court challenges to patent validity at all must satisfy stringent 
Article III standing requirements.131 Their “particularized stake” 
in the patent, on which their standing to sue rests, is often of a 
piece with their incentives to appropriate the full value of their 
investments in litigation, and tend to exclude those would-be 
challengers who might raise patent challenges in what they see 
as the broader public interest.132 A single challenger or a small 
group of challengers is unlikely ever to fully capture the value of 
its successful judicial decree of patent validity, and economic 
theory suggests that collective action against questionable 
patents will likely be undersupplied.133 By allowing Patent Office 
validity challenges with no standing requirement, the AIA has 
lowered the entry cost of engaging in this sort of collective 
action.134 
The way in which this collective action in Patent Office 
proceedings actually plays out is through the PTAB’s joinder 
rules, which authorize the Director to consolidate into a single 
case any other party that has properly filed a petition of its own 
warranting review.135 Across the population of inter partes 
reviews generally and especially in certain technology areas, 
there is considerable joinder among standard and nonstandard 
 
 131.  See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) 
(summarizing that plaintiffs seeking a declaratory judgment on patent validity 
must show that there is “a substantial controversy, between parties having 
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the 
issuance of a declaratory judgement”). 
 132.  See Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 498, 536–37 (2015) (considering standing in relation to the 
circumstances in which consumer patent actions may be appropriate); see also 
Sapna Kumar, Gene Patents and Patient Rights, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 363,  
370 – 72 (2014) (discussing the problem of standing specifically in challenging 
genetics- and genomics-related patents). 
 133. See Miller, supra note 130, at 687–88 (weighing the incentives and 
disincentives of patent validity challenges); see also Burstein, supra note 132, at 
542–48 (demonstrating the “[m]isalignment [b]etween [c]urrent [s]tanding 
[r]ules and [i]ncentives to [b]ring [p]atent [c]hallenges”). 
 134.  See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 49–50 (contemplating 
administrative alternatives as one possible solution to the “collective action 
problem” presented by “expensive Article III litigation”). 
 135.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(c), 325(c) (2018) (granting the Director the 
discretion to “join as a party to the inter partes review any person who properly 
files a petition”). 
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petitioners.136 For example, for drug and medical-related patents, 
48.5% of inter partes review petitioners are standard petitioners 
acting in a defensive posture.137 Among patents in the same field 
of technology, however, 70.8% of the inter partes review petitions 
actually filed had at least one standard petitioner associated with 
it.138 Similarly, the observed petitioners petition disparity for 
mechanical-related patents is 53.1% versus 70.2%.139 These large 
joinder gaps suggest that nonstandard petitioners join petitions 
that standard petitioners have filed.140 
Such joinders are permitted, of course, only if each 
underlying petition “warrants the institution of an inter partes 
review under section 314.”141 In other words, whether standard or 
nonstandard, every petition must satisfy, among other things, the 
one-year time bar of § 315(b) in order to be considered for 
joinder.142 The statutory boundaries between courts and the 
Patent Office give direct shape to the strategic uses that litigants 
make of these administrative proceedings.143 
As a result, in the language of Cuozzo, the “scope and impact” 
of the one-year time bar extend necessarily beyond the walls of 
the Patent Office and into the courts.144 Ensuring compliance 
with the one-year time bar is certainly a necessary element of 
how the Patent Office must screen petitions, and this may 
 
 136.  See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 74 (“[I]n each of these 
technology areas, petitioners who are not prior defendants are joining petitions 
filed by prior defendants.”). 
 137. See id. at 102–03 (displaying graphically the distribution of IPR 
petitioners that were defendants in a prior suit on the same patent, by 
technology). 
 138.  See id. (displaying graphically the distribution of IPR petitions that 
included at least one standard petitioner). 
 139. See id. (showing the disparity in the amount of standard petitioners 
across different technologies). 
 140. See id. at 74 (“The disparities reveal that, in each of these technology 
areas, petitioners who are not prior defendants are joining petitions filed by 
prior defendants.”). 
 141.  35 U.S.C. § 315(c). 
 142.  See id. (outlining the requirements for joiner in IPR).  
 143.  See generally Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8. 
 144. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016) 
(considering the effects of appeals in cases in which statutes present 
constitutional questions or far reaching interpretive questions). 
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suggest that the agency should enjoy unreviewable discretion in 
the matter.145 However, the larger power-allocation function that 
the one-year time bar serves as between the courts and the 
agency counsels strongly in favor of judicial review.146 This 
functional approach, for better or worse, was one that the Court 
itself articulated in Cuozzo.147 
What was clear after Cuozzo was that, for a statutory limit 
on the Patent Office’s screening power to be judicially reviewable, 
the limit had to be more than just analytically separable from the 
screening decision itself; it had to be separable by enough.148 By 
concluding that the one-year time bar is, indeed, separable by 
enough—and is accordingly subject to judicial review149—the en 
banc Federal Circuit produced two important benefits. First, it 
did much to clarify what the necessary and sufficient conditions 
are for that separability. Second, it placed a necessary brake on 
the Patent Office campaign of enlarging its sphere of 
nonappealability, though that campaign still had one further 
engagement. 
D. Resisting Review of Adjudicatory Obligations 
While the Federal Circuit was considering Wi-Fi One, the 
Supreme Court considered yet another case that implicated the 
agency’s conflation of screening with adjudication. At issue in 
 
 145.  See Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (rehearing en banc) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
timeliness requirement contained in the statute is “closely tied to the Director’s 
decision to institute” and “is part of the Board’s institution decision, and is 
therefore barred from judicial review”). 
 146.  See id. at 1377 (O’Malley, C.J., concurring) (“Allowing judicial review of 
erroneous determinations by the PTO as to whether the [statutory] time bar 
applies would prevent the agency from ‘act[ing] outside its statutory limits,’ one 
of the categories of ‘shenanigans’ envisioned by the majority in Cuozzo.” (citing 
Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141–42)).   
 147.  See Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1377 (O’Malley, C.J., concurring) (discussing 
situations in which judicial appeals would be warranted); see generally Porous 
Court-Agency Border, supra note 114. 
 148. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141 (distinguishing nonreviewable 
“screening” limits from reviewable limits “less closely related” to screening). 
 149. See Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1374 (concluding that “the statutory scheme 
as a whole demonstrates that § 315 is not ‘closely related’ to the institution 
decision . . . and it therefore is not subject to [the bar] on judicial review”). 
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SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu150 was the statutory requirement that 
the PTAB, as adjudicator, “shall issue a final written decision 
with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged 
by the petitioner.”151 Indeed, although the dispute in Wi-Fi One 
was quite well suited to testing the analytical reach of Cuozzo, 
the question on which the Court granted certiorari in SAS 
Institute directly exposed what the Patent Office actually gained 
by conflating the power to screen petitions with the power to 
adjudicate them.152 
The contested agency practice in SAS Institute was the 
routine issuance by the PTAB of final written decisions that 
address only some of the patent claims that the petitioner 
challenged.153 In its exercise of screening power, the PTAB 
frequently granted a petition in part and denied it in part, 
proceeding with review only as to certain patent claims or 
grounds.154 At the end of trial, the PTAB’s final written decision 
adjudicated only those patent claims upon which the agency had 
initially granted review.155 The remaining patent claims from the 
initial petition, which had been filtered out up front, were not 
addressed.156 The Patent Office argued that it was free to cherry-
pick from petitions and to adjudicate fewer than all of the claims 
the petitioner had challenged.157 Governing Federal Circuit 
precedent said the same, including the panel decision in the SAS 
 
 150. 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).  
 151. Id. at 1354 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)). 
   152. Id. 
 153. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC (SAS Inst. I), 825 F.3d 
1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (asking if “a final written decision by the Board 
[must] address every patent claim challenged in an IPR petition”). 
 154.  See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2019) (providing that “the Board may authorize 
the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some 
of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim”). 
 155.  See SAS Inst. II, 138 S. Ct. at 1354 (“At the end of litigation, the Board 
issued a final written decision finding claims 1, 3, and 5–10 to be unpatentable 
while upholding claim 4.”); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 
F.3d 1309, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that “the final order of the Board need 
not address every claim raised in the petition for review”). 
 156.  See SAS Inst. II, 138 S. Ct. at 1354 (“[T]he Board’s decision did not 
address the remaining claims on which the Director had refused review.”). 
 157.  See id. at 1355 (“In the Director’s view, he retains discretion to decide 
which claims make it into an inter partes review and which don’t.”). 
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Institute case itself.158 Governing Federal Circuit precedent said 
the same, including the panel decision in the SAS Institute case 
itself.159 
The Court rejected the position of the Patent Office and 
Federal Circuit, holding that the practice of partial institution 
was outside the statutory limits of the agency’s authority.160 
Accordingly, the Court also stated that the necessary scope of 
PTAB final written decisions cannot be narrowed by filtering out 
claims and arguments at the front end.161 And to reach both of 
these conclusions, the Court concluded as an initial matter that 
even though partial institution arose squarely in the exercise of 
the agency’s screening power, that alone did not render the 
practice unreviewable.162 Under the framework of Cuozzo, the 
issue of partial institution represented agency action “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations” and so was well 
within the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review.”163 
As in Cuozzo and Wi-Fi One, what was notable about the 
framing of SAS Institute was neither the argument of the 
petitioner164 nor the controlling Federal Circuit precedent that 
was sought to be overturned.165 Instead, it was the litigation 
 
 158.  See SAS Inst. I, 825 F.3d at 1352–53 (rejecting SAS’s argument that the 
Board erred by not addressing every claim). 
 159.  See id. (rejecting SAS’s argument that the Board erred by not 
addressing every claim). 
 160.  See SAS Inst. II, 138 S. Ct. at 1359 (“[E]verything in the statute before 
us confirms that SAS is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the 
claims it has challenged . . . .”). 
 161.  See id. (agreeing with SAS’ contention that “the Director exceeded his 
statutory authority by limiting the review to fewer than all of the claims SAS 
challenged”). 
 162.  See id. at 1359–60 (“[J]udicial review remains available consistent with 
the Administrative Procedure Act, which directs courts to set aside agency 
action ‘not in accordance with law’ or ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations.’”). 
 163.  Id. at 1360. 
 164.  In this case, SAS Institute was both the PTAB petitioner seeking inter 
partes review in the PTAB and, eventually, the petitioner seeking certiorari in 
the Supreme Court. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, SAS Inst. Inc. v. 
Lee, (No. 16-969), 2017 WL 491052 (U.S., Jan. 31, 2017) (noting that SAS 
petitioned for inter partes review of a patent and challenged patentability of all 
sixteen of the patent’s claims). 
 165. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018) (granting 
certiorari to review the Federal Circuit’s rejection of SAS’ argument that “35 
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position of the Patent Office—this time, about its underlying 
obligation of full and reasoned decision-making.166 
The agency argument went essentially like this. Every 
administrative trial that results in a final written decision has 
gone through an initial screening.167 That initial screening and 
the resulting choice to proceed are immune from judicial review, 
including any agency choice to proceed as to part of the petition 
rather than all of it.168 Therefore, if the final written decision 
omits discussion of any part of the petition, that omission is 
unreviewable because it originates in the agency’s unreviewable 
screening choices.169 Put another way, the Patent Office argued 
that even a statutory requirement pertaining directly to 
adjudication—which is subject to ordinary judicial review—can 
be made unreviewable by connecting some aspect of the 
adjudicatory task to the earlier threshold screening task. 
This remarkable claim of agency power had appeared before. 
In the now-controlling Federal Circuit case that approved partial 
final written decisions by the PTAB, Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor 
Graphics Corp.,170 the Patent Office did not merely argue that its 
practice was entitled to deference under the Chevron doctrine for 
its reasonable resolution of ambiguous statutory language.171 
 
U.S.C. § 318(a) required the Board to decide the patentability of every claim 
SAS challenged in its petition, not just some”). 
 166.  See id. (explaining that 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2018) obligates the Board to 
resolve the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner). 
 167.  See id. at 1356 (noting that 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) requires the Director to 
initially decide whether the petitioner is likely to succeed on “at least 1” claim). 
 168.  See id. at 1359 (stating that 35 U.S.C. “§ 314(d) precludes judicial 
review only of the Director’s ‘initial determination’ under § 314(a) that there is a 
‘reasonable likelihood’ that the claims are unpatentable on the grounds asserted 
and review is therefore justified”). 
 169.  See Brief for Respondent ComplementSoft, LLC at 24, SAS Inst. Inc. v. 
Matal, 138 S. Ct. 350 (2017) (No. 16-969), 2017 WL 3948186 (“Faced with a 
petition that meets its burden as to some claims but not others, the Board has 
basically unreviewable discretion to deny the IPR in full, rather than waste its 
limited resources addressing claims for which the petitioner has not shown even 
a reasonable likelihood of success . . . .”). 
 170.  814 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  
 171.  See id. at 1316 (opining that the regulation “setting forth the standards 
for the showing of sufficient grounds to institute” inter partes review is a 
“reasonable interpretation of the statutory provision governing the institution of 
inter partes review” (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
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Foremost, the agency argued that even the scope of its 
adjudication was unreviewable and that there was no jurisdiction 
even to hear the appeal.172 The Federal Circuit disagreed, and the 
Synopsys precedent that SAS Institute went on to challenge 
rested primarily on a theory of Chevron deference amid 
competing constructions of the statute prescribing final written 
decisions.173 
The competing statutory constructions also implicated the 
presumption that agency actions are reviewable, in the same way 
as Justice Alito’s dissent in Cuozzo had explained.174 The Federal 
Circuit in Synopsys gave great weight to the seeming difference 
in text between the screening and adjudication statutes for inter 
partes review.175 The former provides that a petition shall not be 
accepted for review absent a “reasonable likelihood that the 
petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims 
challenged in the petition.”176 The latter provides that a final 
written decision must address “any patent claim challenged by 
the petitioner and any new claim added under section 316(d).”177 
The latter also makes the issuance of a final written decision 
conditional, requiring it “[i]f an inter partes review is instituted 
and not dismissed under this chapter.”178 
 
467 U.S. 837 (1984))). 
 172.  See id. at 1314 (“The decision of the Board to institute inter partes 
review cannot be appealed.”); Brief for Intervenor–Director of the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office at 14–15, Synopsys, 184 F.3d 1309 (Nos. 
2014-1516, 2014-1530), 2015 WL 1029522 (arguing that the institution decision 
is not reviewable because Congress authorized “this Court to review only the 
Board’s final written decision as to patentability” (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 319, 
318(a))). 
 173. See Synopsys, 814 F.3d at 1316 (stating that, under Chevron, the PTO’s 
regulation allowing the Board to institute as to some or all of the claims is a 
reasonable interpretation of the statutory provision governing the institution of 
inter partes review). 
 174.  See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2150 (2016) 
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If a provision can 
reasonably be read to permit judicial review, it should be.”). 
 175.  See Synopsys, 814 F.3d at 1314–15 (“Congress explicitly chose to use a 
different phrase when describing claims raised in the petition for inter partes 
review in § 314(a) and claims on which inter partes review has been instituted 
in § 318(a).”). 
 176.  35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 177.  Id. § 318(a) (emphasis added). 
 178.  Id. 
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From these provisions, both the Patent Office and the 
Federal Circuit had inferred legislative intent that patent claims 
on which a final written decision is required are different from 
patent claims that undergo initial screening. The reasoning was 
that Congress had used the phrase “claims challenged by the 
petitioner” to distinguish from “claims challenged in the 
petition.”179 To reach this conclusion, however, the Federal 
Circuit had ignored the rest of the statutory text. Because the 
patent owner itself may introduce amended patent claims during 
the proceeding,180 the final written decision must address not only 
what was initially challenged in the patent (and subjected to 
screening), but also what was later amended into the patent.181 
Thus, a more immediately sensible reading is that Congress used 
the phrase “claims challenged by the petitioner” to distinguish 
from new claims added by the patent owner—and to clarify that 
the final written decision must address both.182 The upshot of this 
reading was that screening and adjudication would remain 
analytically separate, and adjudication would remain subject to 
judicial review.183 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit had taken the conditional 
phrase “[i]f an inter partes review is instituted” and inferred from 
it that Congress intended to limit final written decisions not 
merely to cases that are instituted, but to the extent that they are 
instituted.184 This, too, ignored the language that comes next. 
 
 179.  See Synopsys, 814 F.3d at 1315 (explaining that at the first stage, the 
Board reviews “claims challenged by the petitioner” while at the second stage, 
the Board issues a decision as to “claims challenged in the petition” (quoting 35 
U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018); id. § 318(a))). 
 180.  See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (during IPR the patent owner can amend the 
patent by canceling a claim or offering “reasonable substitute claims”). 
 181.  Id. § 318(a). 
 182.  See id. (stating that the Board “shall issue a final written decision with 
respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and 
any new claim added under section 316(d)”). 
 183.  See 35 U.S.C. § 319 (“A party dissatisfied with the final written decision 
of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board under section 318(a) may appeal the 
decision . . . .”). 
 184.  See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed. 
Cir. 2016) (concluding that this conditional phrase in the statute “strongly 
suggests that the ‘challenged’ claims referenced are the claims for which inter 
partes review was instituted, not every claim challenged in the petition”). 
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Another sensible reading was that Congress intended not to 
require final written decisions where review was dismissed 
through, e.g., settlement.185 This would have reflected a sound 
desire for economy in PTAB resources. Indeed, the statute that 
governs settlement of inter partes review directly invokes judicial 
economy by providing for termination “unless the Office has 
decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for 
termination is filed.”186  
On both lines of reasoning, then, the statute governing final 
written decisions could reasonably—indeed, most sensibly—have 
been read in a way that respects the presumption of 
reviewability. For that reason alone, the Court’s eventual 
decision in SAS Institute was correct.187 If instead the Patent 
Office’s resurrected argument from Synopsys had prevailed, it 
would have been difficult to imagine what meaningful sphere of 
judicial supervision could long remain over administrative patent 
validity review. It is straightforward to connect PTAB screening 
to any number of downstream adjudicatory issues. If this logic 
could put even ordinary requirements of complete and reasoned 
agency decision-making beyond the reach of courts, then the 
statute furthest from initial screening would be “closely related” 
enough under Cuozzo to preclude review.188 Either such an 
outcome would have been a significant misreading of Cuozzo, or 




 185.  See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a) (codifying settlement protocol of inter partes 
review). 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2150 (2016) 
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If a provision can 
reasonably be read to permit judicial review, it should be.”). 
 188.  See id. at 2141 (“[W]e need not, and do not, decide the precise effect of 
§ 314(d) on appeals that implicate constitutional questions, that depend on other 
less closely related statutes . . . .”).  
 189.  See id. (“[W]e do not categorically preclude review of a final decision 
where a petition fails to give ‘sufficient notice’ such that there is a due process 
problem with the entire proceeding, nor does our interpretation enable the 
agency to act outside its statutory limits . . . .”). 
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III. Effects of Aggrandized Agency Power 
Part II recounted the agency’s trajectory of 
self-aggrandizement at the expense of the courts, both through 
administrative panel stacking to reach desirable case outcomes 
and through increasingly expansive positions about its immunity 
from judicial review. This Part reveals just what the agency 
stands to gain from these unusually aggressive policies, as well as 
what systemic harms these policies inflict. Part III.A discusses 
the benefits that accrue to the Patent Office, benefits that largely 
work to solidify recent enlargements of the agency’s power. Part 
III.B discusses several systemic harms that these agency choices 
have imposed and continue to impose. Part III.C explores 
alternatives other than judicial review that might be expected to 
discipline questionable Patent Office choices, but concludes that 
these are inadequate in a system where patent rights are 
managed through a decentralized process of adjudication. 
A. Resulting Agency Benefits 
Both sets of benefits to the Patent Office are roughly the 
same. The agency has used panel stacking as a basis for Chevron 
deference, signaling an important departure from recent 
practice.190 The persistent and increasingly broad arguments 
about nonappealability are similarly aimed at securing greater 
autonomy from the courts, but simply under the heading of 
unreviewable discretion rather than deference.191 
 
 190.  See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the 
Era of Patent Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1573 (2016) (noting that the 
agency has argued that it is entitled to Chevron deference because a rule 
governing post-grant proceedings “allow[s] decisions regarding preliminary 
institution of review and final decisions to be made by the same panel”).  
 191.  See id. (“[T]he agency has asserted that the [America Invents Act of 
2011] effectively insulates the PTAB’s preliminary institution of review 
decisions from judicial review, even when the PTAB’s final decision on the 
merits is later appealed.”). 
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1. Chevron Deference from Panel Stacking 
An important effect of Patent Office aggrandizement is that 
the agency has begun using panel stacking as a basis to seek 
Chevron deference for PTAB decisions.192 This marks a shift in 
Patent Office policy, which until recently had been characterized 
by a reluctance to “expend political capital in generating 
Chevron-ready opinions.”193 The necessary and sufficient 
conditions within the PTAB for Chevron deference to apply are 
contested.194 Still, the Patent Office procedures for designating 
PTAB opinions as precedential likely satisfy these conditions.195 
The practice of panel stacking likely does not. 
The familiar starting points for whether Chevron is 
applicable are a delegation by Congress of authority for an agency 
to “speak with the force of law” and an exercise by the agency of 
that authority.196 In practice, speaking with the force of law may 
impose a high bar for adjudicatory orders, as Thomas Merrill and 
Kristin Hickman have proposed.197 On this view, the order must 
be binding not only on the parties involved but also on others 
inside the agency, i.e., must be reviewed by the agency head and 
 
 192.  See id. at 1574 (explaining “[t]he PTO has repeatedly claimed Chevron 
deference for its rules governing post-grant proceedings” which “allow decisions 
regarding preliminary institution of review and final decisions to be made by the 
same panel”). 
 193.  See id. at 1590, 1596 (opining that the PTO has failed to “place itself in 
the strongest position for receiving Chevron deference”). 
 194.  See id. at 1581–84 (summarizing the debate over whether 
“adjudications overseen by agency heads and/or treated as precedential by the 
agency” are the only adjudications that merit Chevron deference). The 
discussion that follows is adapted from Professors Benjamin and Rai’s 
summary. 
 195.  See id. at 1584–85 (“PTAB procedures resemble the sort of 
uncoordinated decision-making process that Mead identified as an indicator of 
decisions that lack the force of law.”). 
 196.  See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219, 226–27 (2001) 
(stating that such delegation can be apparent when “Congress would expect the 
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when addressing ambiguity in 
the statute or fills a space in the enacted law”). 
 197.  See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833, 908 (2001) (arguing that “initial decisions are merely 
recommendations to a higher body within the agency” and are not entitled to 
Chevron deference).  
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carry precedential force upon other agency adjudications.198 
Alternatively, adjudicatory orders deserve Chevron deference 
virtually routinely, as Cass Sunstein has proposed.199 On this 
view, the order need bind only the parties involved, as 
adjudicatory orders generally do.200 This debate is also the subject 
of a circuit split. At one side are the Second, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits consistent with Merrill and Hickman’s approach.201 At 
the other side is the Eleventh Circuit consistent with Sunstein’s 
approach.202 
As applied to the Patent Office, John Golden has argued that 
the stricter standard is appropriate for routine PTAB opinions 
and that such opinions would likely fail under Chevron 
deference.203 Benjamin and Rai agree to some extent, as routine 
PTAB opinions “resemble the sort of uncoordinated 
decision-making process that Mead identified as an indicator of 
 
 198.  See id. (“An adjudicatory order should be understood to have the ‘force 
of law’ in this context only if it is legally binding both inside the agency (that is, 
binding on other agency personnel) and outside the agency (that is, binding on 
the parties to the adjudication).”). 
 199.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 222 (2006) 
(“Chevron deference is inferred from the grant of power to make decisions that 
people violate at their peril.”). 
 200.  See id. at 222 (“[A]n agency decision may be taken to have the ‘force of 
law’ when it is binding on private parties in the sense that those who act in 
violation of the decision face immediate sanctions.”). 
 201.  See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 190, at 1584–85 nn.129, 132 & 134  
(declining to extend Chevron deference to “any statutory construction of the 
[Immigration and Nationality Act] set forth in a summarily affirmed 
[immigration judge] opinion” (citing Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184 
(2d Cir. 2005)); see also Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(finding that review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation of the 
INA is not precluded where it entailed no exercise of discretion); Olson v. Fed. 
Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 381 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating 
that an ALJ decision that has not been reviewed by the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Review Commission is not entitled to Chevron deference). 
 202.  See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 190, at 1585 n.135 (noting that the 
Eleventh Circuit in Florida Medical Center “afforded Chevron deference to an 
ALJ decision that was not subject to higher-level review” (citing Fla. Med. Ctr. 
of Clearwater, Inc. v. Sebelius, 614 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2010))). 
 203.  See John Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 
65 DUKE L.J. 1657, 1685 (2016) (“PTAB decisions in inter partes, covered 
business method, and post-grant review are unlikely to be viewed as warranting 
Chevron deference.”). 
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decisions that lack the force of law.”204 They ultimately conclude, 
however, that the Patent Office Director’s necessary review and 
approval in designating PTAB opinions as precedential does 
make those opinions eligible for Chevron even under the more 
stringent view of Mead that Merrill, Hickman, and Golden 
take.205 
The case of panel stacking is murkier. The statutory 
authority of the Director includes the ability to designate PTAB 
panels of “at least” three PTAB members.206 Similarly, the 
Director and other agency leadership are themselves members of 
the PTAB by statute.207 This suggests, on first impression, that 
politically motivated designations of additional judges for 
rehearings may be acceptable.208 But apart from whether the 
Federal Circuit’s approval of this practice’s predecessor under the 
facts of Alappat remains viable in the current structure of the 
Patent Office209 — and there is reason to believe it does not210 —
panel stacking is also a dubious means for developing the 
institutional coherence needed to speak with the force of law. 
Yet this is precisely what the Patent Office has argued.211 
One example is Yissum, the first of the three above-discussed 
cases in which the agency confirmed its panel stacking practice to 
the Federal Circuit.212 The Patent Office in that case sought 
 
 204.  Benjamin & Rai, supra note 190, at 1585. 
 205.  See id. at 1586 (noting that the PTO’s process “would seem to satisfy 
the more demanding of the two interpretations of Mead”). 
 206.  35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2018). 
 207.  Id. § 6(a). 
    208. Id.  
 209.  See infra Part II.A (explaining that the BPAI was the predecessor of the 
PTAB and differed in important ways, making Alappat distinguishable from the 
present context).  
 210.  See infra Part III.B.1 (noting that the difference between Alappat’s 
BPAI and today’s PTAB is directly relevant to the Director’s supervisory 
authority over the policy choices reflected in administrative panel decisions). 
 211.  Brief for Intervenor–Director of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office at 19–20, Yissum Research Dev. Co. of the Hebrew Univ. of 
Jerusalem v. Sony Corp., 626 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 2015-1342, 
2015-1343) [hereinafter Brief for USPTO] (arguing that the Board is entitled to 
Chevron deference because the USPTO “has acted to ensure that its 
pronouncements remain consistent” across multiple Board hearings).  
 212.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text (showing that the agency 
reconfigures panels in order to ensure that the Director’s policy position is being 
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Chevron deference for its interpretation of how the statutory 
joinder and one-year time bar statutes interact in inter partes 
review proceedings.213 The joinder statute gives discretion to the 
Director to join as a party to an instituted inter partes review 
“any person who properly files a petition” that, in the Director’s 
view, would itself have warranted review.214 The one-year time 
bar, meanwhile, does not apply to “a request for joinder.”215 
Patent owner Yissum distinguished between the joinder of 
parties contemplated by the statute and the joinder of arguments, 
which is unmentioned.216 Yissum argued that the agency had 
previously granted late motions to join arguments but lately had 
“flipped and then flopped,” noting that the statute permitting late 
joinder of arguments was impermissible.217 The result, Yissum 
urged, was an inconsistent agency position that was undeserving 
of Chevron deference.218 
The Patent Office maintained that its consistently held 
position was to permit the late joinder of arguments.219 It is 
supposed flip to forbidding such late joinders came from a panel 
 
enforced by the panels).  
 213.  See Brief for USPTO, supra note 211, at 19 (arguing that “this Court 
should defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of the statute here because 
the statute is ambiguous” (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). 
 214.  35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2018). 
 215.  Id. § 315(b). 
 216.  Yissum’s Opening Brief at 32–33, Yissum Research Dev. Co. of the 
Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Sony Corp., 626 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Nos. 2015-1342, 2015-1343) (noting that “the statute ‘unambiguously does not’ 
permit late joinder of issues, and that the legislative history showed that 
Congress intended only late joinder of parties, and not of issues”). 
 217.  Id. The term “late motion” refers to a motion that comes after the 
one-year time bar of § 315(b). See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (“An inter partes review 
may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 
1 year after the date [on which the complaint is served].”). 
 218.  See Yissum’s Opening Brief supra note 216, at 33 (citing Thomas 
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)) (“[A]n agency’s 
interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation 
is entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view.”). 
 219.  See Brief for USPTO, supra note 211, at 19–20 (stating that the USPTO 
had acted to ensure that its pronouncements remained consistent on the issue of 
late joinder of arguments).   
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decision in Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp.220, 221 
Recognizing the inconsistency, the agency leadership granted 
rehearing and expanded the panel to reach the opposite, correct 
outcome.222 By this account, even if panel stacking is problematic 
on its own terms, it seems to be an effective vehicle for ensuring 
uniformity in implementing the policy preferences of the 
Director.223 To that extent, at least, the agency might have 
spoken consistently enough for the Chevron deference that it 
sought. 
One problem with this account is that it requires a party 
request for rehearing.224 As the Patent Office conceded in its 
briefing for Yissum, the PTAB did deny late joinder in another 
case as being statutorily impermissible—and that case remained 
uncorrected.225 The petitioner in that proceeding declined to seek 
rehearing, apparently denying the PTAB “the same opportunity 
to ensure consistency.”226 If true, it is certainly questionable for 
an agency decision’s precedential force to be held hostage to 
litigant strategy in this manner. 
An even more fundamental problem with the Patent Office’s 
account of consistency through panel stacking is that the agency 
did it multiple times in the Target case. The original PTAB panel 
consisted, as usual, of three judges.227 As the deadline for decision 
 
 220.  No. IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2014). 
 221.  See Decision Denying Motion for Joinder at 11, Target Corp., No. 
IPR2014-00508 (stating that the joinder statute “bars institution of an inter 
partes review based on a petition filed more than 1 year after the date on which 
the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent”). 
 222.  See Decision Granting Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing at 1, Target 
Corp., No. IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2015) (expanding the panel to 
seven administrative patent judges). 
 223.  See Brief for USPTO, supra note 211, at 20 (concluding that “[t]he 
USPTO thus has acted to ensure that its pronouncements remain consistent on 
this issue”). 
 224.  See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019) (conferring the power to seek rehearing 
upon a “party dissatisfied with a decision”). 
 225. See Brief for USPTO, supra note 211, at 20 n.4 (noting that the Board 
held in Skyhawke Techs., LLC v. L&H Concepts, LLC, No. IPR2014-01485 
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2015) that “§ 315(c) does not permit joinder of additional 
grounds by the same party”). 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  See Order on the Conduct of the Proceedings at 1, Target Corp., No. 
IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2014) (limiting the panel to three 
administrative patent judges). 
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drew near, however, the PTAB on its own initiative expanded the 
panel to five judges, and it was this panel who issued the 
supposedly aberrant decision to deny joinder.228 The PTAB’s 
internal procedures for panel stacking do permit this sort of sua 
sponte expansion.229 The panel, in fact, need not await a request 
for rehearing—the internal request may come even in advance of 
a decision by the current panel.230 
Thus, the only way for the expanded five-judge panel in 
Target to have denied joinder as being impermissible was that all 
three judges originally on the panel were planning to rule in this 
way. Indeed, this is just what happened.231 The agency added two 
judges to the panel, hoping to sway one of the original three and 
thus produce a 3–2 decision allowing joinder. None of the three 
judges were swayed, however, and the result was a 3–2 decision 
denying joinder and frustrating the agency’s first, preemptive 
attempt at panel stacking.232 Only upon rehearing did the agency 
leadership add yet another two judges to the panel so that a 4–3 
decision allowing joinder could be assured.233 Even then, the 
three judges on the original panel, now outnumbered, issued a 
dissent adhering to their original position234 just as they 
dissented from the re-stacked panel’s order granting rehearing at 
 
 228.  See Decision Denying Motion for Joinder, Target Corp., No. 
IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2014) (denying petitioner’s motion for 
joinder). 
 229.  See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL 
BOARD STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 1 (REV. 14) ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGES TO 
MERITS PANELS, INTERLOCUTORY PANELS, AND EXPANDED PANELS § III(C), 
https://perma.cc/9M96-UXZ9 (PDF) (“A judge, a merits panel, or an 
interlocutory panel may suggest . . . the need for the designation of an expanded 
panel.”). 
 230.  Id. § III(A)(3).  
 231.  See Decision Denying Motion Joinder, Target Corp., No. IPR2014-00508 
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2014) (in which the three judges from the original panel, 
Bisk, Fitzpatrick, and Weatherly, joined in the majority). 
 232.  See id. (denying joinder despite the dissent of Administrative Judges 
Green and Giannetti). 
 233.  See Decision Motion for Joinder, Target Corp., No. IPR2014-00508 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2015) (listing a decision by Administrative Judges Tierney, 
Green, Change, Giannetti, Bisk, Fitzpatrick, and Weatherly). 
 234.  See id. at 7 (“Section 315(c) does not authorize joinder of proceedings.”). 
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all.235 This, too, calls into question the agency’s claim that it has 
spoken with the force of law and consistently enough for Chevron 
deference. 
This approach by the agency achieves its preferred results 
not through clear, foreordained legal criteria—nor even through 
clear, foreordained designations of which preferred precedents 
are to be followed—but simply through incrementalistic political 
fiat. It reflects a view on the part of the Patent Office that 
deciding cases in an opaque manner is preferable to deciding 
them in a transparently political one even where the decisions 
themselves may have been politically defensible. This sort of sub 
rosa decision-making in the guise of adjudication is not only 
problematic, but also unnecessary. Other mechanisms already 
exist for singling out desirable cases for their precedential value 
and for offering reasoned explanations that are backed by the 
prevailing policy of the executive.236 
2. Autonomy from the Courts Without Chevron 
Patent Office aggrandizement also had a second, more subtle 
effect for a time, though the agency has suffered some recent 
retrenchment. That effect is greater autonomy from judicial 
scrutiny outside the framework of Chevron or other forms of 
deference. The nonappealability of threshold decisions whether to 
institute PTAB review was undoubtedly a legislative choice 
aimed at shielding initial agency screening choices from 
disruptive judicial scrutiny prior to a final judgment.237 The 
 
 235.  See Decision—Granting Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing, Target 
Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp., No. IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 
2015)  
We would deny rehearing because 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) does not provide 
for the relief requested by Petitioner and because its Petition is 
barred by 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Additionally, we would deny rehearing 
because Petitioner has not identified any matter it believes the 
Decision Denying Joinder misapprehended or overlooked, or how that 
matter was previously addressed. 
 236.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 175–76 (2008) 
(describing the process of “reasoning by analogy” in the use of precedent).  
 237.  See Porous Court-Agency Border, supra note 114, at 1090–91 (“[T]his 
border represents the intention of Congress to allocate power differently 
between the courts and the Patent Office, but not to divest either institution 
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expansion of that nonappealability beyond initial screening, 
however, undermines the border that Congress put in place 
between the Patent Office and the Article III courts, and 
arrogates further power from the courts to the agency. 
Expansionary influences like this are especially powerful 
early in a new legal regime, and often create substantial 
path-dependence.238 By the agency’s good luck, the initial years of 
PTAB adjudication under the AIA saw Patent Office arguments 
largely succeed. The first Federal Circuit case to construe the 
agency’s nonappealable screening power was St. Jude Medical v. 
Volcano Corp.,239 in which the panel held that the PTAB’s denial 
of a petition was not appealable.240 On the very same day as the 
St. Jude decision, the Federal Circuit also explained that the 
screening power was generally beyond even the judicial power of 
mandamus to correct, regardless whether the PTAB had granted 
review241 or denied review.242 From these premises, it was—at 
least analytically—a fairly small step to hold, as the Federal 
Circuit panel in Cuozzo did hold, that PTAB decisions to proceed 
with review remain nonappealable even after final judgment.243 
 
completely.”). 
 238.  See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability 
and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1349–50 (1995) (critiquing the stare 
decisis effect of privileging the view of the first court to adjudicate an issue over 
that of the second); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: 
The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 601, 605 (2001) (“The doctrine of stare decisis thus creates an explicitly 
path-dependent process.”). 
 239.  749 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  
 240.  See id. at 1375 (“We base [the decision] on the structure of the inter 
partes review provisions, on the language of section 314(d) within that 
structure, and on our jurisdictional statute read in light of those provisions.”). 
 241. See In re Procter & Gamble Co., 749 F.3d 1376, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(concluding that immediate review of a decision to institute an inter partes 
review is not available). 
 242.  In re Dominion Dealer Sols., LLC, 749 F.3d 1379, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(“[T]he relevant statutory provisions make clear that we may not hear an appeal 
from the Director’s decision not to institute an inter partes review.”). 
 243.  See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 793 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(discussing St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 
1375–76). 
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In a similar turn, the first Federal Circuit case to address 
whether the one-year time bar of inter partes review is judicially 
reviewable was Achates Reference Publishing v. Apple.244 The 
panel in that case held that the PTAB’s determinations regarding 
the one-year time bar were part of the exercise of its screening 
power and so were nonappealable.245 As a result, the Federal 
Circuit, in a series of cases that followed, affirmed all of the 
agency’s applications of the time bar.246 This was not because the 
agency was regularly correct, but because until the en banc 
reversal in Wi-Fi One, the Federal Circuit was bound not even to 
consider the issue.247 
The resulting autonomy for the Patent Office to act without 
any judicial check on its practices has been substantial. 
Importantly, this argument about agency autonomy from the 
courts is distinct from John Golden’s recent suggestion that the 
Patent Office can meaningfully compete with Article III courts, 
including the Federal Circuit, without Chevron deference by 
acting instead through the agency’s position as first mover on a 
range of patent law and policy questions.248 Whereas Golden 
 
 244. See 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We thus hold that 35 U.S.C. 
§ 314(d) prohibits this court from reviewing the Board’s determination to 
initiate IPR proceedings based on its assessment of the time-bar.”). 
 245.  See id. at 653 (“Because the Board’s determinations to institute IPRs in 
this case are final and nonappealable under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), this court lacks 
jurisdiction and dismisses the appeals.”). 
 246.  See, e.g., Click-to-Call Techs., LP v. Oracle Corp., 622 F. App’x. 907, 
907 – 08 (Fed. Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2508 (2016) (dismissing the appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction based on the reasoning in Achates Reference Publishing); 
MCM Portfolio, L.L.C. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1288–89 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (“The law is clear that there is ‘no appeal’ from the decision to 
institute inter partes review. . . . Achates controls here.”); Synopsys, Inc. v. 
Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2016), overruled by Aqua 
Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“This issue is not 
appealable pursuant to § 314(d).”); Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel 
Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[B]ased on Achates, we lack 
jurisdiction to review this aspect of the Board’s decision.”); Wi-Fi One, L.L.C. v. 
Broadcom Corp., 837 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2016), vacated, 878 F.3d 1364, 
1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (upholding the Achates decision). 
 247.  Wi-Fi One, L.L.C. v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (“We therefore hold that the time-bar determinations under 315(b) are 
appealable, overrule Achates’s contrary conclusion, and remand these cases to 
the panel for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”). 
 248.  See Golden, supra note 203, 1691–98 (“[D]espite such constraints, the 
PTO can still accomplish much through adjudicatory processes as patent law’s 
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argues that the Patent Office can influence patent law by acting 
first and framing issues for judicial development,249 the argument 
developed here is that the Patent Office seeks to broaden its 
influence by reducing judicial oversight that would otherwise 
operate upon it. Thus, far from steering the court-agency dialogue 
in directions that the Patent Office might want, the agency’s push 
to interpret the PTAB nonappealability statute increasingly 
broadly is better understood as cutting off more and more of the 
dialogue altogether. 
B. Resulting Systemic Harms 
Where the Patent Office has benefited from this sustained 
pattern of aggrandizement, however, the patent system has 
suffered several notable harms. The particular details of panel 
stacking have done injury to due process, and the result-oriented 
posture of injecting political judgments into patent validity has 
likewise done injury to the property interests that inhere in 
patent rights. Meanwhile, both panel stacking and the evading of 
judicial review have undermined the agency’s ability to make 
credible commitments. Finally, the Federal Circuit’s initial 
acceptance of agency arguments about nonappealability has 
weakened the long-term prospect of oversight upon the agency’s 
future behavior. 
1. Injury to Due Process 
As multiple judges of the Federal Circuit have suggested, 
panel stacking by the Patent Office presents a significant injury 
to due process in the form of “fundamental rule of law questions” 
such as “predictability and uniformity and transparency of 
judgments and neutrality of decision makers.”250 Given the 
 
probable ‘prime mover’—the government body that is likely to be the first to 
address many patent law issues in a centralized and systematic fashion.”). 
 249.  See id. at 1694 (“[I]n part through the issuance of guidance documents 
that do not have the force of law, the PTO has already shown a capacity to 
influence the substantive course of patent law’s development.”). 
 250.  See supra notes 39–52 and accompanying text (exemplifying threats to 
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ascendant power of the Patent Office over the validity of already 
issued patents, the scale of this due process injury is 
correspondingly high.251 Thus far, the agency has defended the 
practice on the basis of a decision that is longstanding, but of 
questionable relevance.252 That decision, In re Alappat,253 
represents a view of agency power that has possibly been 
overcome by intervening changes in the institutional 
environment of the Patent Office.254 
In Alappat, the Commissioner for Patents, then the head of 
the agency, directed the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences to rehear and reverse a case.255 He did so by 
reconstituting the panel with enough others, including himself, to 
outvote the three-member panel who had made the initial 
decision.256 Patent applicant Kuriappan Alappat appealed, and 
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commissioner.257 
The facts of Alappat are similar in several respects to the 
current state of the agency. The BPAI as a whole is now 
reconstituted as the PTAB.258 The political head of the agency is 
now the Director rather than the Commissioner for Patents.259 
The examiners-in-chief of “competent legal knowledge and 
 
due process). 
 251.  See Golden, supra note 248, at 1670 (discussing some limitations on the 
Patent Office’s power “[d]espite the PTO’s increased capacities”). 
 252.  See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1531–32 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (recognizing 
that authority of the Commissioner to designate an expanded panel “to consider 
a request for reconsideration of a decision”), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 253.  33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 254.  Alappat was abrogated by In re Bilski in 2008. Id. In 2012, Congress 
enacted the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, “the largest patent reform since 
1952.” Steven J. Markovich, U.S. Patents and Innovation, COUNCIL FOREIGN 
REL. (Dec. 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/C29P-3AG3 (last visited Sept. 16, 2019) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 255.  See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1531 (“The Examiner . . . requested 
reconsideration of this decision.”). 
 256.  See id. (“The Examiner further requested that such reconsideration be 
carried out by an expanded panel.”). 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  See 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2018) (“Any reference in any Federal law, Executive 
order, rule, regulation, or delegation of authority, or any document of or 
pertaining to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences is deemed to refer 
to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.”). 
 259.  35 U.S.C. § 3. 
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scientific ability” who staffed the BPAI are now administrative 
patent judges who staff the PTAB.260 And just as the political 
leadership of the agency were expressly members of the BPAI 
with authority vested in the Commissioner to designate BPAI 
panels, so now the leadership of the agency are members of the 
PTAB with authority vested in the Director to designate PTAB 
panels.261 
However, when Alappat was decided, the available pool of 
examiners-in-chief from which three-member panels were 
selected were employees appointed to the competitive service.262 
By contrast, administrative patent judges are appointed by the 
Secretary of Commerce263 and are “inferior Officers” with 
“significant functions” and “substantial powers.”264 This 
difference between Alappat’s BPAI and today’s PTAB is directly 
relevant to the Director’s supervisory authority over the policy 
choices reflected in administrative panel decisions.265 
The desire after Alappat to strengthen the political oversight 
power of the Patent Office head and to give the agency more 
 
 260.  Compare 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1994) (“The examiners-in-chief shall be 
persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability, who shall be 
appointed to the competitive service.”), with 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2018) (“The 
administrative patent judges shall be persons of competent legal knowledge and 
scientific ability.”). 
 261.  Compare 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1994) (“The Commissioner, the Deputy 
Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief shall 
constitute the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.”), with 35 U.S.C. § 
6(c) (2018) (“The Director, the Deputy Director, the Commission for Patents, the 
Commissioner for Trademarks, and the administrative patent judges shall 
constitute the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.”). 
 262.  See 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1994) (“The examiners-in-chief shall be persons of 
competent legal knowledge and scientific ability, who shall be appointed to the 
competitive service.”). 
 263.  See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2018) (“The administrative patent judges shall be 
persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability who are appointed 
by the Secretary.”). 
 264.  See John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904, 906 (2009) (discussing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 
868 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 265.  Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era 
of Patent Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1599 (2016) (“In the AIA, 
Congress . . . gave the PTO enhanced authority (to be implemented in the first 
instance by the PTAB).”). 
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autonomy expressly included the experiment of allowing the 
Director to appoint administrative judges.266 That experiment 
ultimately failed, and the reason was precisely that the 
burgeoning importance of administrative patent judges’ duties 
and powers required their appointment by a “Head of 
Department” such as the Secretary of Commerce.267 
That same importance counsels in favor of decisional 
independence for administrative patent judges as well.268 Such 
independence need not divest the Director of his obligation and 
authority to “provid[e] policy direction and management 
supervision” for the agency.269 The current process by which 
PTAB panels are reconfigured reasonably invokes as a 
justification the need “to secure and maintain uniformity of the 
Board’s decisions.”270 For that uniformity to be obtained through 
result-oriented selection of additional judges, however, is 
problematic. 
This problem also came before the Federal Circuit in 
Alappat, in the form of a due process challenge.271 Although the 
court found the issue untimely and did not address it, certainly 
the Commissioner’s desire for an “effective ability to review 
decisions” and to “exercise legal and policy control over decisions” 
by administrative judges seems reconcilable with due process, as 
Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have argued.272 In pursuit of that 
 
 266.  See infra notes 454–455 and accompanying text. 
 267.  See infra notes 456–458 and accompanying text. 
 268.  See Christopher J. Walker, Constitutional Tensions in Agency 
Adjudication, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2679, 2698 (2019) (“Congress did not grant the 
Patent Office Director final decision-making authority over PTAB adjudications. 
Agency adjudicators on the PTAB are thus more insulated from political control 
that their peers at other agencies.”). 
 269.  35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) (2012). 
 270.  See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 229, at pt. III(A)(2) 
(“Consideration by an expanded panel is necessary to secure and maintain 
uniformity of the Board’s decisions, such as where different panels of the Board 
render conflicting decisions on issues of statutory interpretation or rule 
interpretation, or a substantial difference of opinion among judges exists on 
issues of statutory interpretation.”). 
 271. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1536 (1994) (“Amicus Curiae FCBA 
suggests that the Commissioner’s redesignation practices in this case violated 
Alappat’s due process rights.”). 
 272.  See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 190, at 1586–87 (expressing skepticism 
that the remaking of panels to accomplish policy objectives poses a due process 
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purpose, however, the means properly available to the Director 
are not unbounded.273 
For example, the Supreme Court has previously explained 
that “[a]s a member of the Board and the official responsible for 
selecting the membership of its panels, . . . the Commissioner 
may be appropriately considered as bound by Board 
determinations.”274 Moreover, the power to rehear and 
re-adjudicate panel decisions carries with it an obligation to 
consider evidence and argument, for “[t]he one who decides must 
hear.”275 Thus, for members of the PTAB to be placed on a 
rehearing panel with foreknowledge that they “will come out the 
other way”276 improperly puts the decision ahead of the 
consideration of evidence and argument. 
Meanwhile, another mechanism is already available to the 
Director for ensuring uniformity among PTAB decisions. Indeed, 
it is one that comports more fully with the nature of the PTAB as 
a quasi-judicial body with adjudicatory authority independent 
from the authority of the Director.277 That mechanism is the 
curation and designation of PTAB opinions as precedential, 
informative, or representative.278 By default, all panel opinions 
 
concern). 
 273.  See Duffy, supra note 264, at 911 (“[T]he PTO Director’s primary 
duty — to ‘provid[e] policy direction and management supervision for the 
[PTO]’ — is subject to the oversight of the Secretary of Commerce.” (quoting 35 
U.S.C. § 1(a) (2006)) (alterations in original)). 
 274.  Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 523 n.6 (1966). 
 275.  See Duffy, supra note 264, at 908 (citing Morgan v. United States, 298 
U.S. 468, 481 (1936)) (explaining why evidence is crucial for administrative 
adjudication). 
 276.  See supra note 39 and accompanying text (examination of Patent Office 
regarding panel stacking). 
 277.  See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 928–29 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“[T]he Board’s authority to decide the section 101 issue rests on an 
independent grant in section 7(b), which requires the Board to decide patent 
validity issues when properly raised in Board proceedings, and is independent 
from the Commissioner’s authority to establish regulations.”). 
 278.  See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND 
APPEAL BOARD STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2 (REV. 9) PUBLICATION OF 
OPINIONS AND DESIGNATION OF OPINIONS AS PRECEDENTIAL, INFORMATIVE, 
REPRESENTATIVE, AND ROUTINE, https://perma.cc/5ABH-JXLV (PDF) (explaining 
procedures for designating cases as precedential, informative, representative, or 
routine). The description that follows draws heavily from Saurabh 
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are routine unless further action is taken.279 Representative 
opinions describe and curate routine opinions to give 
practitioners and the public a concise view of the case law on a 
certain issue.280 Informative opinions synthesize this descriptive 
survey into normative guidance for practitioners and the public to 
follow.281 Precedential opinions go the furthest and make the 
synthesis binding upon the PTAB itself.282 
However, over the first six years of the PTAB’s operations, 
the agency designated as precedential only ten opinions from the 
administrative trials conducted under the AIA.283 And in the 
main, these opinions pertain to the procedural structure of inter 
partes and covered business method reviews rather than to issues 
of substantive patent law. For the agency “to engage in case-
specific readjudication”284 via panel stacking, especially when it 
has the power to promote decisional uniformity in a prospective 
fashion by designating precedential opinions on which stare 
decisis can operate, represents significant injury to due process, 





Vishnubhakat, Precedent and Process in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 
PATENTLYO (May 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/3KCX-BLUW (last visited Sept. 2, 
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 279.  See Vishnubhakat, Precedent and Process in the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board, supra note 278 (“[A]ll opinions are routine by default, and some 
further action is necessary to elevate an opinion’s status.”). 
 280.  See id. (“Representative opinions offer a sample of typical decisional 
outcomes on a given matter.”). 
 281.  See id. (“Informative opinions articulate the PTAB’s norms on recurring 
issues and offer guidance both on issues of first impression and on PTAB rules 
and practices.”). 
 282.  See id. (“The most difficult to designate and so the rarest 
are precedential opinions, which are binding in all future cases before the PTAB 
unless and until they are superseded by later binding authority.”). 
 283.  Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Precedential and Informative Decisions, 
Issues Specific to AIA Trial Proceedings, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
https://perma.cc/2J8Z-QZ25 (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 284.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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2. Injury to Stable Patent Property Rights 
The prevailing view of patents as property rights suggests 
that stability and certainty in those rights is of chief concern.285 
The current practices of Patent Office aggrandizement have 
compounded existing difficulties in the patent system’s ongoing 
struggle to provide stable rights.286 The existing difficulties are 
well understood and need not be repeated here beyond a brief 
summary.287 However, the additional injuries to stable property 
rights in patents, both directly from panel stacking and indirectly 
from overbroad nonappealability, are different in kind and newer 
in the patent system’s experience.288 
Some of the more persistent challenges to the stability and 
certainty of patent property rights fall under four general 
headings. One is the tension in defining patent law principles in 
terms of predictable rules or flexible standards, a tension that is 
well-known across the law.289 The continually shifting and even 
disruptive nature of invention makes rules difficult to craft and 
 
 285. See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of 
Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 610 (2009) (“Patents convey property 
rights, and a substantial degree of certainty is usually thought to be helpful, or 
even essential to well functioning property rights.”); see also Alan C. Marco & 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 106 (2013) 
(explaining that uncertainty disincentivizes patents). 
 286.  See Duffy, supra note 285, at 612 (“Thus, the Federal Circuit and its 
predecessor court have changed the rules governing patentable subject matter 
no less than three times in thirty years.”). 
 287.  See, e.g., id. at 612–13 (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, 
Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (explaining the short-lived 
reassurance of clear patent adjudication standards “in light of the refocusing of 
the § 101 issue that Alappat and State Street have provided”). 
 288.  See Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of 
Adjudication, 107 CAL. L. REV. 141, 159–60 (2019) (describing the new Patent 
Office rules under the AIA regarding nonappealability and the Director’s 
influence on PTAB outcomes). 
 289.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 
953, 957 (1995) (“In every area of regulation . . . it is necessary to choose 
between general rules and case-by-case decisions.”); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus 
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 616–17 (1992) (discussing 
how rules and standards change over time); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, 
An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) 
(discussing “the conditions under which greater specificity or greater generality 
is the efficient choice”). 
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unlikely to survive in the long run.290 By contrast, standards may 
be more durable but none the clearer for that, as it is their very 
flexibility and openness to facts—especially technological facts in 
the context of patent law—that were not anticipated and 
planned-for that makes the outcomes of standards uncertain and 
unpredictable.291 Recent years have provided many examples of 
this tension in patent law, arising from the Supreme Court’s 
repeated dissolution of the Federal Circuit’s bright-line doctrinal 
rules.292 
A second existing challenge to stable patent property rights 
is the lack of durability in important principles of patent law, 
even when they do take the form of fairly clear rules. As John 
Duffy has observed, “clarity without durability has limited value 
for a system in which long term investment in tomorrow’s 
innovations is supposed to be fostered through property rights 
lasting for two decades.”293 For example, the doctrine of 
patent-eligible subject matter suffered this very fate repeatedly in 
the last forty years, with bright-rule Federal Circuit rules 
thwarted either by newer attempts at the same or by Supreme 
Court interventions to impose standards instead.294 
A third is the problem of notice, especially about the 
boundaries of the patent right. Claimants to knowledge resources 
such as invention may often have incentives to frame their claims 
vaguely, either because the cost of delineating precisely is high or 
because full information is not available yet about where among 
 
 290.  See Duffy, supra note 285, at 614 (“The unruly process of creative 
destruction has the power to undermine today’s legal rules every bit as much as 
it renders obsolete today’s industrial products, processes, and institutions.”). 
 291.  See id. (“[A] clear but transient rule may be inferior to a standard that 
is less clear and less predictable in application, but more durable.”). 
 292.  See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2, 42–47 
(2010) (“Beginning in the mid-1990s . . . the Supreme Court increasingly 
asserted its appellate jurisdiction over the Federal Circuit. . . . The Supreme 
Court’s deference to Federal Circuit jurisprudence . . . appears to have ended.”); 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal 
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 789, 797–800 (2008) 
(describing the relationship between the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit). 
 293.  Duffy, supra note 285, at 614–15. 
 294. See id. at 612–13, 623 (summarizing both the variety and evolution of 
Federal Circuit rules and Supreme Court standards of patent-eligible subject 
matter).  
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resource claims the greatest value might lie.295 The increasingly 
contested placement of patent law within property theory adds 
more difficulty, as property-based approaches to patent law are 
often viewed as a mere proxy for stronger substantive rights for 
patent owners, though in fact, property-based approaches can 
impose greater obligations on patent owners as well.296 
Meanwhile, even within the patent-property framework, it is 
questionable whether the right level of notice that a patent (in its 
entirety) should provide is best measured by comparison merely 
to fences around land, rather than the correspondingly broad 
estate boundary of a real property interest.297 
Fourth, and closely related to the problem of notice, is the 
problem of comparative institutional competence in evaluating a 
given patent right. When the Patent Office examines patent 
applications and generates a legal right in the form of a patent, 
the agency certainly has greater technological expertise, doctrinal 
familiarity, and policy experience than the generalist federal 
courts that are most likely to enforce or reevaluate the patent in 
the future.298 However, because courts have the last word on 
patent validity precisely as a check on agency decision-making,299 
 
 295.  See Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice 
Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 13–14 (2013) (internal quotations omitted) 
(describing potential motivators and benefits for a claimant to frame his or her 
claims vaguely). 
 296.  See Deepa Varadarajan, Of Fences and Definite Patent Boundaries, 18 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 563, 594–95 (2016) (“Property-talk has helped expand 
the rights of patent holders, but it can also support erecting hurdles meant to 
improve the notice function of claims.”). 
 297.  See Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 
1687, 1697–98 (2013) (cautioning against mistaken conceptual comparisons 
within the patent-property framework as the term property right encompasses a 
variety of legal rights).  
 298.  See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of 
Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts 
and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1701 
(2009) (“Most district court judges are generalists who never hear enough patent 
cases to become experts in that area of law.”). 
 299.  This was, of course, much more the case before the ascendancy of 
administrative patent revocation, though the availability of judicial review 
remains a key justification for the constitutionality of the administrative 
system. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. 
Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018) (analyzing the constitutionality of inter partes review).  
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the value of the patent both as a legal right and as an economic 
asset can be quite uncertain when that value is based only on the 
actions of the Patent Office.300 Empirical estimates confirm this 
intuition, revealing that resolving uncertainty about the patent 
qua legal right “is worth as much on average as is the initial 
patent right.”301 
The recent practices of the Patent Office have only added 
more fuel to these existing fires. The nature of panel stacking is 
necessarily to depart from the adjudicatory conclusion that a 
PTAB panel has already reached after evaluating the evidence 
and applying relevant legal principles to the technological facts of 
the case.302 It is, as the agency itself has conceded, a “case-specific 
readjudication” to vindicate other values that the agency’s 
political leadership might find worthwhile.303 This case-by-case 
injection of political values into the validity and scope of property 
rights is a destabilizing force. Indeed, the more valuable the 
patent property right is, the more likely it is to be involved in 
litigation304 and, correspondingly, to be challenged in the 
PTAB.305 Meanwhile, the agency’s attempts to broaden its 
nonappealable discretion push toward making it less and less 
accountable to independent judicial checks on its power.  
Of course, not every such case-by-case judgment involving a 
property interest will necessarily cut against the property owner. 
A specific Patent Office administration may instead be quite 
 
 300.  See Marco & Vishnubhakat, supra note 285, at 104, 132 (discussing the 
effect of uncertainty about patent validity upon the value of patents). 
 301.  Id. at 104. 
 302.  See John M. Golden, PTO Panel Stacking: Unblessed by the Federal 
Circuit and Likely Unlawful, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2447, 2449 (2019) (“[The] PTO 
Director and Director’s delegee, the Chief Judge of the PTAB, have sometimes 
sought to reverse disfavored PTAB judgments by convening expanded panels of 
PTAB judges personally selected by the Director of Chief Judge to consider a 
request for rehearing—a practice commonly known as ‘panel stacking.’”).  
 303.  See Oral Argument at 47:20, supra note 39 (capturing testimony in 
which the Patent Office admits to panel stacking in order to push the Director’s 
policy agenda).  
 304.  See generally John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 
(2004) (examining what makes a patent valuable and how to identify valuable 
patents).  
 305.  Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for 
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (analyzing the relationship between 
litigated disputes and disputes settled before or during litigation). 
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protective of patent rights. If confronted with a PTAB panel 
judgment that invalidates some or all of a patent right, such an 
administration might see fit to stack the panel and preserve the 
property interest against cancellation. Even individual victories 
like this for the patent owner, however, are no less destabilizing 
to the patent right itself. These judgments, too, rest just as 
strongly on the problematic premise that the patent is not a legal 
right to be adjudicated in accordance with stable principles of 
neutral and general applicability—but instead is subject to the 
political priorities of agency decision-makers.306 
In all, the politically inflected treatment of patents poses 
significant concerns about due process and other constitutional 
protections for property interests.307 It also compounds the 
problem of durability with which patent law already struggles, so 
that not only are doctrines of patent law flimsy and potentially 
fleeting but so also is the integrity of individual patent rights.308 
 
 306.  This premise is problematic not only from the perspective of legal 
theory, but also economic theory insofar as economic actors will rationally avoid 
both dealing with an untrustworthy government and dealing with each other 
where the benefits of their productive exchanges may be expropriated. See 
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 871 (2009)  
Because government has a monopoly on the exercise of coercive 
powers, it has the authority . . . to take private assets . . . ignoring 
property and contracts rights in the process. But without stable 
property and contract rights, those with resources will not want to 
engage in financial dealings with the government . . . . 
see also JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, 
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 1–77 (2000) (discussing constraint theory 
and why an individual may choose to engage in self-binding); Douglass C. North 
& Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of 
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. 
ECON. HIST. 803, 803 (1989) (“The more likely it is that the sovereign will alter 
property rights for his or her own benefit, the lower the expected return from 
investment and the lower in turn the incentive to invest.”). 
 307. See Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the 
Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2007–08 (2009) (discussing the 
conceptual shift in property theory that “made it possible for the administrative 
state to control and restrict various property uses without implicating the 
constitutional protections of the Takings or Due Process Clauses.”); see also 
Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical 
Protection of Patents under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 693–711 
(2007) (analyzing the history and intersection of patents, property, and 
constitutional private property). 
 308.  See supra notes 293–294 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
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In turn, the likely and rational result of destabilization in the 
legal integrity of patent property rights is for economic actors to 
seek other means for appropriating value from their 
investments.309 The main competitor of patent protection would 
be trade secrecy, and a turn to trade secrecy would directly 
contravene the patent system’s aim of broader and faster 
dissemination of knowledge.310 
3. Injury to Credible Commitments 
The foregoing critique of imposing political valence on patent 
rights follows from a property-rights conception of patent law, but 
a property-based conception is not necessary to the critique. A 
view of patents as a form of regulation or public franchise rather 
than as a type of property311 also has much to reject about the 
 
lack of durability in principles of patent law affects stable patent property rights 
and limits the value of a system premised on long term investment). 
 309. See Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting 
Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. 
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), https://perma.cc/M7DV-9P4R (PDF) (“In 
addition to the prevention of copying [a patent], the most prominent motives for 
patenting include the prevention of rivals from patenting related inventions 
(i.e., ‘patent blocking’), the use of patents in negotiations and the prevention of 
suits.”). 
 310. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated 
Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1494 (2002) (“[P]atent 
protection is conditioned on full disclosure; trade secrecy rests on 
non-disclosure.”); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well 
Should We Be Allowed to Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 11 (1998) (“One way to think of the 
secrecy requirement in trade secrets law is as a substitute for the quality 
dimension of other laws—the novelty and nonobvious requirements of patent 
law, and the authorship and originality requirements of copyright law.”). 
 311.  Much has been written to debate whether patents are, indeed, property 
and should be treated accordingly. See, e.g., Varadarajan, supra note 296, at 
573 – 75 (citing, inter alia, Eric R. Claeys, On Cowbells in Rock Anthems (and 
Property in IP): A Review of Justifying Intellectual Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1033, 1035 (2012)) (discussing the conflicting views between “property 
skeptics” and “property essentialists” which differ on whether to apply property 
terminology and rhetoric to patents); David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the 
Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 652–57 (2010) (analyzing the importance 
of property rhetoric in the public domain); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual 
Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 113 (1990) (stating 
the Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act of 1989 assimilated 
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particular recent self-aggrandizements of the Patent Office. In 
this context, panel stacking and agency discretion that is broadly 
unreviewable by the courts undermines the ability of public 
institutions, including and especially the Patent Office itself, to 
make credible commitments to innovators and investors.312 
Adherence to the legal principles of property is an example of 
credible commitments.313 However, because property rights, 
especially rights in private property, are vindicated primarily in 
the courts,314 a departure from property-centric views of patent 
law might suggest that a lack of robust judicial review is 
commensurately less problematic. As discussed below, there is 
reason to doubt this.315 Still, the broader problem of credible 
commitments is a distinct implication of the Patent Office’s 
recent actions. 
The theory of credible commitments may be summarized as 
holding that an institution can induce others to behave, and 
especially to invest, in desirable ways by voluntarily constraining 
 
intellectual property to other property). 
 312.  The literature on credible commitments derives primarily from new 
institutional economics. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) (applying transaction cost economics to 
economic organization, emphasizing behavioral assumptions of bounded 
rationality and opportunism); Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible 
Commitment, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 11 (1993) (examining 
the evolution of institutional theory while exploring how to develop institutions 
that provide credible commitments, enabling more complex contracting). It also 
has some counterpart in the political science literature on agency commitments 
but is, as Elizabeth Magill points out, concerned with a different set of 
questions. See Magill, supra note 306, at 872 n.40 (citing MURRAY HORN, THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 7–24 (1995)) (stating political scientists’ primary argument on 
agency commitments is the creation of and delegation “to make a credible 
commitment to a constituency about the stability of policy in the future”). The 
discussion that follows draws primarily from the legal literature that applies 
credible commitment theory to the problems of administrative agency action. 
 313.  See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) (providing adherence to the legal principles of 
property as an example of credible commitments). 
 314.  See Maureen E. Brady, The Damaging’s Clauses, 104 VA. L. REV 341, 
409 (describing how inconsistencies in state interpretations of takings and 
damaging clauses “have the effect of preserving federal forums for vindicating 
federal property rights”).  
 315.  See infra Part III.C (discussing alternatives to judicial review). 
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its own decisional power.316 In general, the relevance of credible 
commitments to executive action affects the President or the 
executive branch as a whole, whose actions vis-à-vis the 
coordinate branches of government, the public, or the market are 
being evaluated.317 In this context, where an executive agency is 
concerned, the commitment is that of the President to signal 
credibly the agency’s future policy priorities by acting in certain 
ways including the appointment of the agency head.318 Indeed, as 
an agency itself answers variously to all three branches, it “does 
not even fully control its own destiny because those principals can 
force the agency to change its commitments.”319 
That said, agencies do have some limited abilities to make 
credible commitments. According to what Thomas Merrill has 
called the Accardi principle, the discretion that an administrative 
agency might enjoy can be turned upon itself to bind its own 
future action.320 Under Accardi, an agency is obliged to follow its 
own duly promulgated regulations, and to act otherwise is 
contrary to law.321 Thus, where no relevant regulation exists to 
bind the agency’s hand, despite delegated authority for the 
agency to create it, one of two explanations is likely. The agency 
may value the flexibility of its own power more than it values the 
credibility of the commitments it can make to stakeholders. Or, if 
 
 316. See Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 
HARV. L. REV. 31, 64–65 (2016) (“Constraints on decisional power can also 
generate credible commitments that induce others to behave in desirable ways. 
States and governments that can credibly commit to protecting property rights 
or repaying debts will benefit from economic investment and the ability to 
borrow on favorable terms . . . .”).  
 317.  E.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 865, 865–68 (2007) (discussing the “the dilemma of credibility that 
afflicts the well-motivated executive” as both legislators and the public grant the 
executive discretion while still harboring distrust of the executive). 
 318.  See id. at 900 (citing Nolan McCarty, The Appointments Dilemma, 48 
AM. J. POLI. SCI. 413, 418–21 (2004)). 
 319.  Magill, supra note 306, at 872. 
 320.  See Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
569, 571 (2006) (describing the “[Supreme Court’s] first full-fledged 
endorsement of the idea that agencies must follow their own regulations”). 
 321.  See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–67 
(1954) (determining that the Board of Immigration Appeals is bound to exercise 
its own judgement prior to a final review by the Attorney General as dictated by 
the agency’s regulation in question). 
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the agency does, in fact, value the credibility of its proffered 
incentives more, it is simply acting irrationally. 
Given the current posture of the Patent Office at the 
formative stages of the first robust adversarial system for 
administrative patent revocation, these two potential 
explanations are especially salient. If the use of panel stacking 
represents a deliberately muscular use of the agency’s discretion 
(or at least of the discretion that the agency thinks it has), then 
the agency has been trading away its already limited ability to 
make credible commitments to induce investments in innovation. 
If that is not the result the agency wants, then it is not trading 
away the commitment mechanism but simply squandering it. 
The push for broader unreviewable discretion is fraught with 
similar problems. Until 2005, agencies were even more robustly 
able to commit credibly to future courses of action.322 If a court 
held that a statute that the agency administered is unambiguous, 
with an accompanying interpretation of the statute by the court 
itself, then the stare decisis effect of that judicial interpretation 
would naturally bind the agency.323 Though this outcome would 
likely be disagreeable to the agency, it would at least lend 
credibility to the agency’s promise to act according to the court’s 
interpretation.324 If the agency wanted to seek that credibility 
proactively, it could interpret an ambiguous statute reasonably 
and secure a judicial holding approving the agency’s 
interpretation based on Chevron deference.325 The binding 
interpretation would be the agency’s own, but binding it would 
 
 322.  See Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency 
Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2007) (discussing how agency 
ability to shift policy and revise interpretations of ambiguous statutes with 
greater flexibility peaked in 2005).  
 323.  See id. (comparing “if a court determines that a statue is unambiguous, 
the agency is entitled to no deference and thus no flexibility” to “if a statute is 
ambiguous, a court must afford deference to a valid agency interpretation and 
must allow the agency flexibility to adjust its interpretation over time”).  
 324.  See id. (“[S]tare decisis trumps Chevron, in which case a pre-existing 
judicial decision would lock a statute’s interpretation in place.”). 
 325.  See id. (summarizing how Chevron entitles an agency interpretation of 
an ambiguous statute deference). 
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be. The stare decisis effect would be the same, as would the 
resulting credibility of the agency’s promise.326 
That changed after National Cable & Telecommunications 
Association v. Brand X Internet Services,327 in which the Supreme 
Court held that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute 
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron 
deference only if the prior court decision holds that its 
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute 
and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”328 In other words, 
judicial findings about the meaning of ambiguous statutes could 
no longer enjoy stare decisis effect, and an agency could no longer 
rely on judicial entrenchment to make its own commitments 
credible.329 
In light of this change, the sustained litigation agenda by the 
Patent Office to make its discretion in PTAB cases increasingly 
unreviewable is even more baffling. As with panel stacking, the 
relevant trade-off at hand is whether the agency values the 
flexibility of its discretion more than the credibility of its 
commitment to induce innovation through the incentive of stable, 
durable patent rights.330 Such an agenda might have been 
conceivable prior to Brand X as a matter of longer-term agency 
policy, especially if the agency had not yet rendered a 
Chevron-worthy interpretation. On that view, the agency today 
could exercise flexible discretion, and the option to seek Chevron 
deference tomorrow would remain.331 However, after Brand X, 
pushing to expand unreviewable discretion only aggravates the 
 
 326.  See id. (describing how stare decisis and Chevron deference both have 
precedential value). 
 327.  545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 328.  Id. at 982. 
 329. See Masur, supra note 322, at 1036–37 (discussing the interaction 
between Chevron and precedent after the Supreme Court’s decision in Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.). 
 330.  See id. at 1024 (“[A]n agency will have difficulty convincing regulated 
parties to invest resources or take other actions that may well be critical to the 
success of a regulatory initiative when it cannot assure the private actor that 
the agency rule—upon which these investments depend—will remain in 
place . . . .”). 
 331.  See id. at 1032 (citing Chevron itself that in such cases, courts “must 
allow the agency the flexibility to adjust its interpretation over time”). 
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Patent Office’s inability to look to judicial entrenchment as a 
source of credibility to back the agency’s own assurances.332 
The sum of these effects is, ironically, that the recent 
power-seeking acts of the Patent Office have the net effect of 
undermining the agency’s power of persuasion to induce 
investments.333 Ultimately, it is this ability to make credible 
commitments that is at the heart of the agency’s importance to 
innovation policy. To risk losing it is short-sighted and has the 
potential to inflict lasting harm on private decisions about 
resource allocation. 
4. Injury to Future Oversight 
Finally, beyond the present and potentially lasting harms 
that these Patent Office policies are likely to bring about within 
the tolerance of the agency’s current judicial authorities, the 
future supervisory power of the courts is also at stake. The push 
for greater judicial unreviewability carves out an autonomous 
space for the PTAB to act without judicial scrutiny today,334 but it 
also forestalls correction by judicial powers to come. 
This is significant because the early precedents in which the 
Federal Circuit endorsed the agency’s burgeoning view of 
nonappealability could easily have gone the other way, providing 
for judicial review instead and frustrating the agency’s attempts. 
By choosing not to do so, the Federal Circuit created a slippery 
slope where none existed, nor needed to. 
The best indication of this counterfactual possibility is that, 
on a closely related statute, the precedents did go the other way. 
In Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.,335 
decided over a year after St. Jude and its companion cases and, 
 
 332.  See John M. Golden, supra note 302, at 2448 (assessing how in light of 
recent Supreme Court rejections of challenges to the constitutionality of 
proceedings reviewing the validity of issued patent claims, the Patent and 
Trademark Office will likely continue to be the leading trial forum for such 
proceedings). 
 333.  See supra note 306 and accompanying text (summarizing how stability 
in patent property rights and incentives to invest are inversely related).  
 334.  See supra Part III.A.2. 
 335.  793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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coincidentally, only a day after its panel decision in Cuozzo, the 
Federal Circuit held that in petitions for covered business method 
review, judicial review can be had over the PTAB’s application of 
the definition of “business methods” that are eligible to be 
challenged.336 The panel majority in Versata distinguished the 
facts of that case from those of Cuozzo,337 but it is also reasonable 
to infer that a different panel would reached the opposite 
conclusion in Cuozzo. For example, Judge Newman, who joined 
the panel majority in Versata, was also on the panel in Cuozzo 
and dissented there, arguing essentially the Versata majority 
opinion.338 
The result, on balance, was a series of Federal Circuit 
appeals from the PTAB in which the deemed unavailability of 
judicial review suppressed important differences of opinion about 
the merits of Patent Office policy and procedure. For example, 
Judge Reyna in Shaw Industries joined the panel’s opinion that 
the PTAB’s refusal to grant review on a particular ground was 
judicially unreviewable under then-governing precedents.339 
However, Judge Reyna also wrote separately to voice deep 
concern about the agency’s extraordinary claim to autonomy from 
judicial oversight.340 In his view, the PTAB had been using that 
autonomy improperly, rejecting what it termed “redundant 
 
 336.  See id. at 1320 (discussing “the general presumption favoring judicial 
review” and how nothing in the statute in question precluded judicial review). 
 337.  See id. at 1322 (stating Cuozzo did not address either of the issues the 
Court decided in concluding it may review whether the patent at bar is a 
covered business method patent). 
 338.  Compare In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1291 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting) (concluding the “America Invents Act was 
enacted to enable the [PTO] to resolve issues, at reduced cost and delay”), with 
Versata, 793 F.3d at 1321 (asserting “it is clear from the legislative history of 
the AIA that Congress purposely set out to create a relatively simple and 
expedited administrative process”). 
 339. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 
1297–98 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing both St. Jude, 749 F.3d at 1376, and Cuozzo, 
793 F.3d at 1273) (“We lack jurisdiction, however, to review the Board’s 
decisions instituting or denying [inter partes review] . . . This is true regardless 
of whether the Board has issued a final written decision.”). 
 340.  See id. at 1302 (Reyna, J., concurring) (“The Board’s improper, 
conclusory statements declining to implement inter partes review (“IPR”) of 
grounds it found to be “redundant” leave me deeply concerned about the broader 
impact that the Redundancy Doctrine may have on the integrity of the patent 
system.”). 
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grounds” without any explanation for how it was exercising its 
screening power.341 Unbound by earlier Federal Circuit 
precedents such as St. Jude or Cuozzo, these concerns would 
likely have counseled against such broad acceptance of judicial 
unreviewability. And, indeed, when the Federal Circuit sat en 
banc in Wi-Fi One to reconsider the unreviewability the one-year 
time bar, it was Judge Reyna who wrote for the 9–4 majority 
reversing Achates and imposing a principled limit on Patent 
Office autonomy.342 
To some extent, this sort of path-dependence is an ordinary 
result of stare decisis and the purpose of generating binding 
precedent.343 However, when the jurisprudential issue at stake is 
judicial review itself, the stakes are different in kind. Wherever 
else the Federal Circuit might bind itself in agency appeals, 
particular care is needed on the issue of judicial review. Policing 
its own power of oversight is what keeps the Federal Circuit 
capable of policing the potential excesses of the Patent Office. 
C. Alternatives to Judicial Review 
Even when confronted with this account of benefits to the 
agency that are of dubious public value and of the grave systemic 
harms that are likely to result, one may reasonably ask whether 
judicial review is the only cure, or even the best cure. The Patent 
Office, after all, sits in the Department of Commerce and answers 
through to the Secretary of Commerce and the President.344 It 
 
 341.  See id. (“[T]he [Patent Trial and Appeal] Board’s only basis for not 
instituting the additional grounds was that those grounds are “redundant” of 
the instituted grounds, without any reasoned based why or how the denied 
grounds are redundant.”). 
 342.  See Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (en banc) (stating “[e]nforcing statutory limits on an agency’s authority to 
act is precisely the type of issue the courts have historically reviewed” and thus, 
time-bar determinations are reviewable).  
 343.  See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and 
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 602–05 
(2001) (applying path dependence theory to the law to assess the influence of 
history in the United States’ common law system).  
 344.  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2(b)(8) (2012) (stating the Patent and Trademark 
Office is within the Department of Commerce, subject to the policy discretion of 
1734 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2019) 
also relies for its funds on the White House Office of Management 
and Budget345 and, ultimately, on Congress itself.346 These 
political principals exercise considerable influence over the 
agency.347 Thus, if the problem is that the agency is behaving in 
unduly political ways, an effective means of discipline might be to 
turn to these principals.348 
However, there are notable problems with these political 
alternatives. For one thing, they give up the game on stable 
property interests in patent rights349 and, to the same extent, do 
little to resolve the due process concerns involved.350 The result is 
not only an entrenchment of incumbent political interests that 
have access to the public powers that oversee the Patent Office. It 
is also, more perniciously, an entrenchment of incumbent 
economic interests in the market, incumbency that could be 
disrupted in socially valuable ways by new entrants armed with 
patents.351 Judicial review, though it also often favors 
well-resourced litigants as an empirical matter, does not base its 
 
the Secretary of Commerce, and shall advise the President, through the 
Secretary of Commerce, on intellectual property issues). 
 345.  See id. § 3(a)(2)(B) (requiring the Director to consult with the Patent 
and Trademark Public Advisory Committees, respectively and applicably, before 
submitting budget proposals to the Office of Management and Budget). 
 346. See id. § 42(e) (requiring the Secretary of Commerce to submit the 
Patent and Trademark Office’s fiscal reports and proposed budget to Congress). 
 347.  See Giulio Napolitano, Conflicts and Strategies in Administrative Law, 
12 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 357, 360 (2014) (discussing Congress’ structural and 
procedural control over agencies in order to channel and monitor future 
bureaucratic action).  
 348.  See id. (“‘Stacking the deck’ in favor of certain groups, removing some 
decisions from the choice set, requiring or forbidding an agency to consider 
certain issues, and placing the burden of proof on an agency  . . . are among the 
most preferred devices [of congressional control].”).  
 349.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 350.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 351. See Sean M. O’Connor, Crowdfunding’s Impact on Start-Up IP Strategy, 
21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 895, 900 (2014) (“Patents allow start-ups to appropriate 
the value of their [research and development] results by giving them legally 
enforceable exclusive rights that can be exercised against large incumbents 
seeking to copy the start-ups’ innovations.”); Stephen H. Haber, F. Scott Kieff & 
Troy A. Paredes, On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in 
Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 222 (2008) (“[P]atents are 
powerful antimonopoly weapons—the vital slingshots “Davids” use to take on 
“Goliaths.”). 
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substantive judgments about the correctness of a position on the 
political or economic status of the litigant.352 
Another difficulty is that these alternatives for correcting 
undesirable Patent Office action risk the appearance of injecting 
politics into an apolitical process. Although panel stacking in the 
PTAB and the arguments for broader unreviewability of the 
PTAB advance priorities that are unrelated to the PTAB’s 
adjudicatory mandate, these agency actions have nevertheless 
been carried out under the guise of, and through the apparatus 
of, adjudication.353 Overt political means of agency discipline such 
as a mandate from a higher executive power or budgetary 
leverage from Congress would likely be received as an escalation 
by the Patent Office and, although it might resolve the immediate 
grievance in the PTAB, would be unlikely to change the agency’s 
long-term behavior with respect to the underlying structural 
problems discussed here. 
Finally, perhaps the most pedestrian and formally legal 
reason against abjuring judicial review is also the most 
fundamental: it has been central to justifying the PTAB’s very 
existence. The Supreme Court concluded recently in Oil States 
Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC354 that the 
system of inter partes review that Congress established in the 
AIA is, indeed, constitutional.355 Among the key attributes of 
PTAB review to which the Court pointed in emphasizing “the 
narrowness of [its] holding” was that “the Patent Act provides for 
judicial review by the Federal Circuit.”356 As a result, the Court 
expressly avoided the question “whether inter partes review 
would be constitutional without any sort of intervention by a 
 
 352.  See Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL UNIV. 
L. REV 649, 649–52 (2010) (discussing the relationship between litigant wealth 
and litigation outcomes while addressing the neutral role the court must play). 
 353.  See John M. Golden, supra note 302, at 2464 (“[PTO] panel stacking is a 
reasonable way for the PTO Director to oversee [PTAB] adjudication where 
Congress has failed to give the Director a more conventional mechanism for 
doing so . . . .”).  
 354.  138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).  
 355.  Id. at 1379 (affirming the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that inter partes 
review does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment). 
 356.  See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012)) (“[T]he Patent Act provides for 
judicial review by the Federal Circuit . . . .”). 
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court at any stage of the proceedings.”357 In short, judicial review 
was a significant element of the set of sufficient conditions that 
underlay the constitutional legitimacy of PTAB review as 
currently structured. The erosion of that review by the Patent 
Office itself, therefore, stands to erode the very foundation on 
which the agency’s system of administrative patent revocation 
rests. 
IV. Sources of Agency Aggrandizement 
Part III discussed the benefits that have motivated the 
Patent Office in the aggrandizements detailed in Part II, the 
resulting systemic harms, and the continuing superiority of 
judicial review over other means for ensuring agency discipline. 
This Part reveals the origin story, explaining why the Patent 
Office colorably thought itself empowered to act as it has. That 
exercising the patent validity power ex post was once almost 
exclusively the province of the courts, but is now increasingly and 
conspicuously the province of the Patent Office, is well 
documented.358 
However, as Part IV.A explains, the reasoning behind this 
reallocation has traditionally been an account of greater 
expertise, lower cost, and more accurate outcomes in the 
specialized agency setting than the courts would have offered. To 
that traditional account Part IV.B adds a largely neglected 
rationale: a desire for greater political input in the patent system. 
Part IV.C then takes that generalized desire for political input, 
which Congress itself shared and implemented in certain discrete 
domains, and delves into the actual decisional structure of the 
 
 357.  See id. (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 445 (1977)) (“[W]e need not consider whether 
inter partes review would be constitutional ‘without any sort of intervention by 
a court at any stage of the proceedings.’”).  
 358.  See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 78–81 (discussing how 
the Patent Office assesses and decides invalidity petitions while the federal 
courts manage patent infringement litigation which the aforementioned 
petitions impact); see also Youngest Patent Validity Proceeding, supra note 118, 
at 345–47 (addressing ex post review up to the America Invents Act); Mark D. 
Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation 
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3–7 (1997) (discussing the 
role of the Patent and Trademark Office in American patent law jurisprudence). 
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PTAB, showing that the agency has consciously commingled two 
separately delegated powers in a bid to obscure its remarkable 
claims to power that Congress did not give. 
A. The Traditional Account: Expertise 
When Congress was considering what would become the first 
transfer of the patent validity power from Article III courts to the 
Patent Office, the typical posture for reviewing patent validity 
had been as a defense in infringement litigation359 or, somewhat 
less commonly, as a claim for declaratory judgment that the 
patent was invalid.360 The motivations for an administrative 
alternative were primarily of institutional competence.361 The 
considerable cost and delay of patent litigation, constrained 
access from Article III standing requirements, and the accuracy 
of the decisions that courts produce were all matters of concern.362 
Although the extent and effect of these concerns is undoubtedly 
greater today,363 cost and delay were deeply felt even when 
Congress was considering enacting ex parte re-examination.364 
 
 359. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2018) (providing that “[i]nvalidity of the 
patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part II as a condition for 
patentability” shall be a defense to infringement). 
 360. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (authorizing any court of the United States to 
“declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such 
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought”); see also Walker 
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176 (1965) 
(noting that “one need not await the filing of a threatened suit by the patentee; 
the validity of the patent may be tested under the Declaratory Judgment Act”). 
 361.  See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 51–55 (discussing 
motivations for administrative rather than judicial review of patent validity). 
 362. See id. (summarizing the interrelated arguments in favor of 
administrative review). 
 363. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What Patent Attorney Fee Awards Really 
Look Like, 63 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 15, 18 (2014) (summarizing the cost of patent 
infringement litigation across different tiers of disputed value based on data 
from the American Intellectual Property Law Association’s biennial Report of 
the Economic Survey). 
 364. See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. I, at 3–4 (1980) (emphasizing the 
potential for administrative review to resolve patent validity questions “without 
recourse to expensive and lengthy infringement litigation”). 
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So was accuracy. Contemporary empirical research suggests 
that the federal courts may not be particularly accurate on 
questions of patent validity,365 such as the proper interpretation 
of terms within patents.366 Longitudinal research also suggests 
that judges with experience specific to patent law are less likely 
to suffer reversal on appeal and that is true of recent as well as 
cumulative patent experience.367 However, though this research 
may tend to vindicate historical efforts to transfer power away 
from a generalist court toward an expert agency, the 
contemporaneous desire in 1980 for more accurate patent case 
decisions was different in a subtle, but important way that 
reveals much about the power transfer itself. 
Rather than imagining the court as a unitary decision maker 
that could be beneficially supplanted by an agency decision 
maker, makers of patent policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
were quite sensitive to how the validity power was shared, within 
a court, between judges and juries.368 There was robust 
disagreement on whether a jury was the right audience for patent 
validity issues of both scientific and legal complexity, but the 
controversy was not about accuracy as such.369 Judges tended to 
agree that in reaching accurate decisions, the best that a jury 
 
 365. See generally Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in 
Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637 (2013) (discussing proposals to improve 
accuracy in the resolution of patent disputes). 
 366. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical 
Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 
223, 248  – 49 (2008) (identifying rates of reversal due to improperly construed 
terms). 
 367. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the 
Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the 
Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 443–44 
(2011) (discussing empirical research on the effects of judicial experience on 
rates of reversal). 
 368. See, e.g., The Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 88 F.R.D. 369, 387 (1980) [hereinafter 
Seventh CCPA Conf.] (providing personal observations of the Hon. Frank J. 
McGarr). 
 369.  See, e.g., The Eighth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 92 F.R.D. 183, 275–77 (1981) [hereinafter 
Eighth CCPA Conf.] (preserving on record anecdotes from judges in attendance). 
While some judges agreed that juries could follow most cases, others found 
certain issues too complex for the average juror to understand. 
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could do was as well as a judge,370 and quite often the jury was 
likely to make mistakes.371 The source of mistake might have 
been that juries are suggestible to clever lawyering, that they 
depart from evidence or judicial instruction, or simply that they 
lack scientific or legal literacy.372 At all events, these were 
utilitarian concerns. 
The argument in favor of jury trials in patent cases, 
meanwhile, was based on constitutional principle.373 Whatever 
the wisdom of jury trials in patent cases, the Seventh 
Amendment required it.374 Put another way, the jury right in 
patent cases was not welcomed because it produced accuracy; it 
was tolerated because it was, higher courts had said, 
constitutionally necessary. The real policy debate was about 
power. 
The agenda to shift power from courts, particularly juries, on 
patent validity issues and into the Patent Office had one 
particularly persuasive aspect. The problems of cost, delay, and 
accuracy insofar as juries were concerned were still relatively 
new.375 Only twenty years earlier had the Supreme Court set the 
 
 370. For example, of the Hon. William C. Conner suggested in his remarks 
with that “the jury is usually right. At least they make the same mistakes as 
judges.” Id. at 276. 
 371. See Seventh CCPA Conf., supra note 368, at 387 (listing remarks by the 
Hon. Frank J. McGarr opining that “juries have complicated the patent 
litigation situation, and I don’t think they have contributed to the end product 
we all seek, which is the doing of justice and the achieving of the right result”). 
 372.  See id. (enumerating the pitfalls encountered by jurors in complex 
patent litigation). 
 373. Judge McGarr, just before his criticism of jury decision-making, stated 
the tension plainly: 
I would not say . . . that I am hostile to the jury idea in patent cases. 
You have to be careful how you say this because the jury right is a 
very genuine one, and attorneys should have a right to a jury if the 
court says that juries are available in patent cases, and it sounds like 
the judge is arrogating unto himself the total power of decision . . . . 
Id. at 386. 
 374. See generally Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 344 (4th Cir. 1971) 
(issuing a writ of mandamus directing the district court to allow demands for 
jury trials on patent validity as well as infringement because the Seventh 
Amendment jury trial right applied to patent cases and was not lost by 
combining legal claims for damages with equitable claims for injunctive relief). 
 375.  See infra note 380 and accompanying text (demonstrating that jury 
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constitutional premise requiring patent validity to be tried to 
juries.376 In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,377 the Court held 
that where a case presents both legal issues (such as a claim for 
damages) and equitable issues (such as a claim for injunction), 
the right to have the legal issues tried to a jury cannot be lost by 
deciding the equitable issues first in a bench trial.378 
Before Beacon Theatres, that loss of jury trial would not only 
have been doctrinally ordinary but also empirically rare.379 As 
Figure One shows, among patent trials annually, fewer than a 
handful were tried to juries in the years preceding Beacon 
Theatres.380 Where a jury trial was demanded, judges first tried 
equitable claims and then allowed the jury to try whatever legal 
claims remained.381 At that point, the loser in equity was, due to 
collateral estoppel, unable to reargue the lost issues to the jury, 
including the issue of patent validity.382 Once it became clear that 
the holding in Beacon Theatres applied to patent cases,383 a case 
with a jury demand had to be put to the jury first. The share of 
patent cases that were tried to juries began to rise, and although 
many a judge tried “to make everything a legal issue he can make 
 
trials were empirically rare, and the associated costs had yet to be realized). 
 376. See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959) 
(designating the trial court’s use of discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) to 
deprive a party of a full jury trial impermissible). 
 377. Id. 
 378. See id. at 501–11 (“[O]nly under the most imperative circumstances . . . 
can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of 
equitable claims.”). 
 379. See infra note 380 and accompanying text (charting the percentage 
increase of patent jury trials). 
 380. Figure 1, found in the Appendix, is reproduced from J. Jonas Anderson 
& Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative 
Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 20 (2013). I am 
grateful to Professors Anderson and Menell for sharing the underlying data that 
they compiled from separate sources. 
 381.  See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 
VA. L. REV. 1673, 1706 (2013) (noting how the common practice of holding jury 
trials only after bench trials explained the small number of patent jury trials in 
the decades before Beacon Theaters).  
 382. Id. (citing Ralph W. Launius, Some Aspects of the Right to Trial by Jury 
in Patent Cases, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 112, 112–13 (1967)). 
 383. See Tights, 441 F.2d at 338, 343 (recognizing the right to submit legal 
issues to a jury notwithstanding the complexity of patent cases). 
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a legal issue to minimize submission to the jury,”384 there was an 
appetite to roll back more systematically the larger problem of 
juries reviewing technical questions of patent validity. 
The resulting system for ex parte reexamination was only the 
start. In the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999,385 a new 
system for inter partes reexamination offered yet another 
alternative for litigants to leave courts and seek review in the 
Patent Office.386 The issues of court-agency power that these 
first- and second-generation administrative proceedings raised 
bear a striking resemblance to the current controversies over 
patent validity review under the AIA.387 Foremost among these 
were two issues, the substitutability of the Patent Office for 
district courts in reevaluating patents and the contours of judicial 
review over the Patent Office.388 In order to appreciate these two 
issues more fully, however, it is first necessary to identify a less 
widely appreciated rationale for transferring ex post power over 
patent validity away from courts and into the agency. 
B. The Neglected Rationale: Political Input 
That rationale is a desire to seek greater political input into 
the patent system. On first impression, the notion of imbuing a 
system of property rights with political salience is peculiar. 
Well-functioning property rights regimes tend to arise from legal 
structures that reflect certainty and durability389—rarely the 
 
 384.  Seventh CCPA Conf., supra note 368, at 385. 
 385. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 
Stat. 1501. 
 386.  See id. (giving the PTO some authority to conduct inter partes 
adjudicatory proceedings). 
 387.  See generally Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in 
Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965 (2009) (discussing the evolution of the 
PTO’s administrative influence compared to that of the judicial branch). 
 388.  See id. at 1975 (discussing increased judicial deference to the PTO’s 
findings); see also Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex 
Ante Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1239 (2012) 
(noting the resemblance of post-grant review proceedings to formal 
adjudications). 
 389. See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of 
Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 610–11 (2009) (highlighting the 
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stuff of politics. Nevertheless, persistent themes in the patent 
literature and across multiple domains of patent policy reveal a 
view that patents should be treated as a species of regulation or 
monopoly privilege rather than property,390 that patent law 
should be regarded as public rather than private law,391 and that 
the patent system should be approached essentially as a field of 
industrial policy.392 These views are systematically political and 
exert considerable pressure against traditional accounts of 
patents as private property rights that are best mediated by 
 
necessity of “certainty” to well-functioning property rights; see also Craig Allen 
Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 759 
(1999) (articulating the benefits of propriety certainty). 
 390.  For scholarship discussing this tension and its effects, see Adam 
Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 
370–77 (2009) (analyzing the role of conceptual property theory in patent law); 
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1031, 1035 n.8 (2005) (identifying a dichotomy within intellectual property 
theory); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 253, 304–05 (2003) (discussing whether patents should be considered a 
form of monopoly or more akin to the traditional property right of exclusion); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Patents, Property, and Competition Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 
1243, 1243 (2009) (considering whether competition policy should have a more 
prominent role in the patent system). 
 391.  See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 41, 43 (2012) (stating that “patent validity challenges are complaints 
about government conduct that implicate important public interests and 
potentially affect many parties not before the court”); Megan M. La Belle, Public 
Enforcement of Patent Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1866 (2016) (proposing an 
enforcement scheme for patent law); Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of 
“Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 517 (2014) (rejecting the private 
remediation of infringement as antithetical to the “overarching aim” of patent 
law); Sapna Kumar, Standing Against Bad Patents, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 87, 
87 (2017) (discussing use of standing jurisprudence to hinder challenges to bad 
patents before the PTAB). 
 392. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 
J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 248 (1994) (positing that the economic policy behind patent 
law can be thought of as industrial policy “because it uses legal intervention to 
decide what policies to promote”); see also Michael H. Davis, Patent Politics, 56 
S.C. L. REV. 337, 339–40 (2004) (describing patent law as “a kind of disguised 
industrial policy”); Oskar Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy 
to Intellectual Property, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (2012) (classifying patent law 
as industrial policy rather than a theory of property); Allen K. Yu, Within 
Subject Matter Eligibility—A Disease and a Cure, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 387, 388 
(2011) (emphasizing “the importance of viewing the patent regime not just as a 
property system, but as part of a larger regulatory regime for promoting 
innovations”). 
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market ordering.393 As a result of these pressures, reallocations of 
the ex post patent validity power away from courts and into the 
Patent Office now also have a clear political valence.394 
To understand the politicization of ex post patent validity, it 
is helpful first to clarify what it does not represent. For one thing, 
it is not merely a more specific recapitulation of post-realist 
attitudes about the malleability of property rights more 
generally.395 Nor is it a systematic remaking of the Patent Office 
into a more formally participatory and deliberative agency—a 
“surrogate political process”396 similar to that of the 
Environmental Protection Agency—as scholars including James 
Boyle397 and Kali Murray398 have advocated. 
Instead, the move of ex post patent validity toward a political 
sphere has come in a more piecemeal fashion. A direct 
mechanism for the change has been the specific way in which the 
patent validity power was reallocated away from courts and to 
political authorities within the Patent Office.399 Another, more 
indirect, has been the emergence of technology- and 
industry-specific laws and policies pertaining to patentability and 
patent validity. Taken together, these mechanisms have produced 
ex post a trend similar to what Arti Rai has described and 
 
 393.  See Lemley, supra note 390, at 1032 (noting the similarities between 
the “Protectionist” regime for intellectual property and traditional private 
property theory). 
 394.  See infra notes 399–400 (explaining the politicization of patent validity 
decisions).  
 395.  See Arti K. Rai, Competing with the “Patent Court”: A Newly Robust 
Ecosystem, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 386, 386–87 (2014) (comparing 
historical accounts that liken patents to inviolable tangible property with 
modern views); see also Mossoff, supra note 307, at 2013 (discussing the role of 
intellectual property theory in redefining property in land). 
 396. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1975). 
 397. See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism 
for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 87 (1997) (exploring a theoretical “political 
economy” of intellectual property) . 
 398. See Kali N. Murray, Rules for Radicals: A Politics of Patent Law, 14 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 63, 64 (2006) (using environmental law as a comparative model 
to conceptualize a world of politically-molded patent law). 
 399.  See Rai, supra note 388, at 1238–39 (identifying the ways in which the 
PTO has increased its influence within patent policy). 
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advocated with regard to ex ante decision-making by political 
actors about patent validity.400 
1. Empowering the Agency’s Political Leadership 
From the start, administrative exercise of the patent validity 
power has been divided. The eventual determination of validity 
has been made by an administrative adjudicator. In ex parte and 
inter partes reexaminations, that has been the reexaminer.401 In 
AIA reviews, it has been a panel of at least three administrative 
patent judges.402 Prior to consideration of the merits, however, 
petitions for each type of administrative proceeding have always 
been screened to ensure that expending resources to reconsider 
patent validity would not be a waste.403 
In ex parte and inter partes reexamination, the legal 
standard for this screening was to identify a “substantial new 
question of patentability.”404 Now in inter partes review, covered 
business method review, and post-grant review under the AIA, 
the standard is a sufficient likelihood that the proceeding will 
successfully invalidate at least one claim in the challenged 
patent.405 Covered business method and post-grant reviews’ 
screening criteria can be separately satisfied if “the petition 
raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to 
 
 400. See id. at 1244 (positing “whether the PTO should be given rulemaking 
authority over substantive patent law . . . .”). 
 401. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2253, 2656 (9th ed. 2018) (designating Examiner to 
determine validity in ex parte and inter partes reexamination). 
 402. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b)(4), (c) (2012) (requiring review by a three-member 
panel). 
 403. See infra notes 404–414 (identifying varying levels of screening 
requirements).  
 404. 35 U.S.C. § 303; see U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 
401, at § 2216 (stating the screening standard for ex parte reexamination); 35 
U.S.C. § 312; see also U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 401, at 
§ 2616 (stating the screening standard for inter partes reexamination). 
 405. The standard for IPR is a “reasonable likelihood” of success. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 314(a). Meanwhile, the standard for CBM and PGR is that success is “more 
likely than not.” Id. § 324(a); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (subjecting proceedings implemented 
pursuant to the transitional program for covered business method patents to the 
same standards and procedures of a post grant review). 
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other patents or patent applications.”406 Ex parte reexamination, 
moreover, does not require a third party to seek review: the 
agency may open review of the validity of an issued patent on its 
own initiative and at any time.407 
In all of these administrative proceedings, the power to carry 
out the screening rests with the political head of the agency.408 
Since 2000, that has been the Director of the Patent and 
Trademark Office, a position that is also styled the Under 
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property.409 Prior to 2001, 
the relevant political head was the Commissioner of Patents, and 
the ex parte reexamination statute referred to that position 
accordingly.410 
This repeated investment of the screening power in the 
political, rather than adjudicatory, structure of the Patent Office 
is significant. The widely recited justification for administrative 
adjudication is that the agency has a comparative advantage in 
scientific expertise;411 this, in turn, is said to lower costs, expedite 
resolutions, and ultimately produce more accurate decisions.412 
 
 406.  35 U.S.C. § 324(b); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1) 
(using the same standards and procedures of post-grant review for covered 
business method patents). 
 407. See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (“On his own initiative, and any time, the 
Director may determine whether a substantial new question of patentability is 
raised . . . .”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2019) (authorizing ex parte reexamination at 
the initiative of the director); see also U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
supra note 401, at § 2239 (vesting discretion in the director to order 
reexamination even in the absence of a request by the parties). 
 408. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 314(a), 324(a) (discussing when the director 
may authorize review or determine that a substantial new question of 
patentability exists). 
 409. See AIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. I § 4713, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 3(a) (2000)) (“The powers and duties of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office shall be vested in an Under Secretary of 
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office . . . .”).  
 410. See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982) (designating Commissioner to make the 
determination whether a substantial new question of patentability is raised). 
 411.  See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 53 (quoting 35 U.S.C. 
§ 6 (2018)) (“In contrast [to federal judges], administrative patent judges have 
long been required to be ‘persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific 
ability.’”). 
 412.  See id. at 52–54 (discussing arguments in favor of administrative 
review). 
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Placing a political filter at the threshold of the process, however, 
undermines the presumed procedural neutrality of technical 
expertise. This effect is especially stark for ex parte 
reexamination, where the political agency head, who already 
holds the keys to review, may open the gates on his own initiative 
with no need to wait (as federal courts must wait) for private 
parties to initiate a case.413 It is questionable whether apolitical 
impartiality should be sacrificed in exchange for technical 
expertise in this way. 
Even if the benefits of such a tradeoff outweighed the costs, 
however, it seems clear that judicial review of the agency’s 
screening would be needed to ensure that a political head’s 
exercise of threshold power was not unduly distorting the 
substantive agency adjudications that follow. But this is not the 
case, either. The Director’s screening decision has been “final and 
nonappealable” in every iteration of administrative validity 
review, starting with ex parte reexamination,414 continuing with 
inter partes reexamination,415 and now in the AIA proceedings.416 
The details of this nonreviewability have changed in important 
ways, moreover, from reexamination to the AIA proceedings.417 
2.  Making Technology- and Industry-Specific Policy 
Although conferring judicially unreviewable power upon 
Patent Office leadership to screen requests for patent 
reevaluation is the most direct injection of politics into how the 
validity power is exercised, it is not the only one. The agency has 
also become receptive to ex post political input into patent validity 
 
 413.  See supra note 407 and accompanying text (explaining the 
authorization of ex parte reexamination at the director’s discretion). 
 414. 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1982); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1988); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) 
(1994); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) 
(2018). 
 415.  35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) 
(2018). 
 416. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(d), 324(e) (2018) (prohibiting appeal for inter 
partes and post-grant review). 
 417. See infra notes 470–475 and accompanying text (discussing the 
presumptive reviewability of subsequent adjudication). 
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through indirect interventions in patent law and policy.418 The 
common thread in these laws and policies is that they are specific 
to certain technologies and industries.419 
To be clear, the particular trend of tailoring patent law and 
policy by technology and industry, like the politicization of patent 
validity more generally, is a broad and complex phenomenon with 
a variety of structural implications for the patent system.420 The 
enacted law of patents is a set of broad, unitary standards that 
are theoretically context-neutral,421 but these standards can 
operate quite differently in practice and application across 
technologies and industries.422 This much is straightforward, 
even self-evident.423 More politically salient, however, is the 
argument that law- and policy-makers, primarily courts, should 
take conscious account of these disparities and should try to 
tailor patent protection to perceived economic goals and 
exigencies.424 
This argument is even more politically salient when the 
institution involved is not the judiciary, but the Patent Office. 
The reason to meet technology and industry needs through 
 
 418.  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1586–87 (2003) [hereinafter Policy Levers] (remarking on 
government-created incentives for research and development). 
 419.  See id. at 1587 (“[T]he amount of nonpatent incentives to innovate 
varies by industry.”). 
 420.  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law 
Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1155–57 (2002) [hereinafter 
Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?] (reflecting on the implications of applying 
technology- and industry-specific rather than neutral standards). 
 421. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Expired Patents, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 419, 
420–26 (2015) (discussing technology-specificity in patenting); see also NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY 42 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (“[The patent system] is a 
unitary system with few a priori exclusions.”). 
 422. See Mark D. Janis, Comment: Equilibrium in a Technology-Specific 
Patent System, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 743, 743–44 (2004) (expressing 
reservations concerning the feasibility of equilibrium in patent law); see also Is 
Patent Law Technology-Specific?, supra note 420, at 1156 (commenting on the 
inconsistency of rule application across different industries). 
 423. See Janis, supra note 422, at 743 n.2 (“Or, to put it more succinctly, 
‘duh.’”). 
 424. See Policy Levers, supra note 418, at 1579 (noting the substantial 
latitude courts possess to “[adapt] the patent statute to evolving technologies”). 
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judicial tailoring rather than, say, legislative tailoring is that the 
legislative process invites rent seeking and fails to adapt quickly 
enough to innovation.425 Legislative tailoring also produces 
balkanized legal regimes and requires costly litigation to resolve 
boundary line-drawing issues between adjacent regimes.426 
Tailoring by courts, for all its flaws,427 is likely to be more 
responsive and less prone to capture than sector-specific 
legislation.428 
Thus, reallocating technology- and industry-specific ex post 
patent validity judgments out of the courts and into the Patent 
Office represents not one, but two political moves. One is the very 
act of actively tailoring patent protection in service of economic 
policy goals rather than merely recognizing that such effects may 
come about naturally in different fact contexts. The other is the 
placement of this tailoring with an agency that is itself a target 
for efforts at rent seeking and capture.429 
 
 425.  Id. at 1578. 
 426.  See Janis, supra note 422, at 745 (considering whether numerous 
boundary issues would inundate the dockets of even the most skilled patent 
judges). 
 427.  See Rai, supra note 388, at 1242–43 (listing the drawbacks of article III 
adjudication). 
 428.  See Policy Levers, supra note 418, at 1578–79 (“[C]oncerns about . . . the 
inability of industry-specific statutes to respond to changing 
circumstances will lead us to conclude . . . that we should not jettison our 
nominally uniform patent system in favor of specific statutes that protect 
particular industries.”); see also Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the 
Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 57 (2010) (discussing “capture-
prone administrative rulemaking”). 
 429.  See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 100 (U. of Chi. Press 2009) (“Technology-specific patent 
legislation encourages rent-seeking”); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six 
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and 
Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 592 (1999) (explaining that 
an indirect cost of issuing invalid patent includes rent-seekers who take 
advantage of the relaxed patent standards); Carl Shapiro, Patent System 
Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1022–23 
(2004) (showing the problems created by patent monopolies and how 
competition authorities are addressing them); John R. Thomas, The 
Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent 
Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 731 (2002) (reasoning that 
the USPTO is a target for “rent-seeking entrepreneurs” who want to form patent 
acquisition ventures). 
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The most direct example of this sector-specific politicization 
in ex post exercises of the patent validity power is covered 
business method review under the AIA.430 Structurally, CBM 
proceedings follow the standards and procedures of post-grant 
review.431 In application, meanwhile, CBM reviews allow the 
invalidation even of patents issued prior to the AIA, just as inter 
partes reviews allow.432 What distinguishes covered business 
method review from other AIA proceedings, however, is its 
emphasis on a particular industry sector: 
[T]he term “covered business method patent” means a patent 
that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for 
performing data processing or other operations used in the 
practice, administration, or management of a financial product 
or service, except that the term does not include patents for 
technological inventions.433 
The statute also calls for this definition to be elaborated 
through agency regulation.434 The result is still greater political, 
rather than adjudicatory, valence to the Patent Office’s ex post 
power over patent validity. 
C. Commingled Powers in the Patent Office 
The agency’s power over patent validity is divided into two 
tasks—screening PTAB petitions for apparent merit and 
adjudicating selected petitions—and these tasks rest with the 
agency’s political leadership and adjudicatory apparatus, 
respectively.435 This alone might be cause for concern, as it 
 
 430.  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 18, 125 
Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011) (discussing the transitional program for covered 
business method patents). 
 431.  See id. § 18(a)(1) (describing how the transitional program shall employ 
the standards and procedures of post-grant review). 
 432.  See id. § 18(a)(2) (explaining how the regulations of this subsection 
apply to any covered business method patents issued before the Act). 
 433.  Id. § 18(d)(1) (emphasis added). 
 434.  See id. § 18(d)(2) (clarifying that the Director can issue regulations for 
determining whether a patent is for a technological invention). 
 435.  See supra notes 404–410 and accompanying text (listing the screening 
criteria for inter partes review, covered business method review, and post-grant 
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interposes a political filter at the threshold of an adjudicatory 
process traditionally justified in terms of agency expertise.436 For 
better or worse, however, this has been the pattern of ex post 
patent validity review in the Patent Office from the start.437 
What is cause for greater concern is that the screening and 
adjudicating functions in modern AIA review are currently 
commingled in the same entity within the agency: the PTAB.438 
That commingling is likely unauthorized under the law.439 It has 
also produced undesirable incentives for the Patent Office to 
evade judicial review, incentives that the agency has pursued in 
progressively broader, more far-reaching arguments.440 
Although the AIA delegates to the Director the power to 
screen petitions for inter partes review, covered business method 
review, and post-grant review,441 the Director does not personally 
exercise this power.442 Instead, the Director has subdelegated this 
power to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.443 The AIA also 
delegates to the PTAB the power to adjudicate, and this 
 
review under the AIA).  
 436. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 55–56 (discussing the 
reasons to favor administrative review of post-patent proceedings over Article 
III review). 
 437. Both ex parte and inter partes reexamination, for example, placed 
initial screening of petitions seeking administrative review within the power of 
the Director and, prior to that, the Commissioner for Patents. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 303 (1980) (providing that the Director will determine new questions of 
patentability within three months following a request for reexamination); see 
also id. § 312 (1999) (listing the requirements for a petition under section 311). 
 438.  See Porous Court-Agency Border, supra note 114, at 1078 (stating that 
the Director has the authority to sub-delegate screening power to the PTAB and 
to conduct the actual review). 
 439.  See id. (claiming that Patent Office adjudication is politically distorted 
due to the authority delegated to the politically appointed Director of the Patent 
Office to screen requests for review).  
 440. See supra Parts I.B–I.D (outlining the different approaches taken by 
the Patent Office to avoid judicial review). 
 441. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), 324(a) (2012) (discussing the authority of the 
Director in instituting inter partes review and post-grant review). 
 442. See Porous Court-Agency Border, supra note 114, at 1078 
(acknowledging that the Director sub-delegates the screening power to a 
three-judge panel in the PTAB). 
 443. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2012) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf 
of the Director.”). 
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delegation is direct.444 In current practice, the panel of three 
administrative patent judges who screen a petition for sufficiency 
are the same panel who adjudicate the petition if it is accepted for 
review.445 
However, it is doubtful that the Director has authority to 
subdelegate the screening function to the PTAB in this way.446 
The ability of the Director to subdelegate his powers extends to 
subordinates whom the Director has himself appointed.447 The 
Director may “appoint . . . officers, employees (including 
attorneys), and agents”448 and may “define the . . . authority . . . of 
such officers and employees and delegate to them such of the 
powers vested in the Office.”449 These constraints matter because 
the Director may not act outside any “specific limitation on [his] 
delegation authority.”450 
The administrative patent judges of the PTAB are not within 
the reach of this delegation authority because the Director does 
not appoint judges to the PTAB.451 That power rests with the 
 
 444. See 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (delegating to “the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board” the authority and obligation to issue final written decisions in inter 
partes reviews); see also id. § 328(a) (discussing the authority of the “Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board” to issue final written decisions in post-grant reviews 
and, by extension, covered business method reviews). 
 445. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1028 
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Patent Office “has determined that, in the 
interest of efficiency, the decision to institute and the final decision should be 
made by the same Board panel”). 
 446. This argument was advanced by the appellant in Ethicon v. Covidien, 
and the discussion here tracks substantially that argument. See Brief for 
Intervenor-Director of the USPTO, Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 
812 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (No. 2014-1771), 2015 WL 1523016, at *29 
(arguing that the statutory limits prohibit the Director from delegating the 
institution decision to the PTAB). 
 447.  See 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(3) (describing the authority of the Director to 
appoint officers, employees, and agents and to define their duties). 
 448.  Id. § 3(b)(3)(A). 
 449.  Id. § 3(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). 
 450.  Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 169 (1991). 
 451.  See Pub. L. No. 110-313, § 1(a), 122 Stat. 3014, 3014–15 (2008) 
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 6 to provide that the Secretary of Commerce, in 
consultation with the Director of the PTO shall appoint administrative patent 
judges).   
1752 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2019) 
Secretary of Commerce.452 In fact, the power to appoint PTAB 
judges must rest with the Secretary of Commerce for their 
authority to be constitutionally legitimate under the 
Appointments Clause.453 Starting in 2000, the Director did have 
authority to appoint judges to the Board454 in an effort to enhance 
his oversight of agency affairs and to give the agency more 
autonomy and operational freedom.455 However, it became clear 
by 2008 that this authorization was impermissible.456 
Accordingly, Congress revised the statute to its current form, 
authorizing “the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the 
Director,” to appoint Board judges457 and fix the constitutional 
defect.458 Thus, the problem of subdelegating the Director’s 
screening function to the PTAB may be intractable. The Director 
 
 452.  See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (“The administrative patent judges shall 
be . . . appointed by the Secretary”). 
 453.  See generally John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges 
Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904 (2009). 
 454.  See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4717, 113 
Stat. 1501 (1999) (“The administrative patent judges shall be . . . appointed by 
the Director.”). 
 455.  See 154 CONG. REC. H7234 (2008) (statement of Rep. Steve King) 
(“[I]nventors, trademark owners, and Members of Congress believed the agency 
would function more efficiently if it were allowed greater operational freedom.”). 
 456. See id. at H7233–35 (statements of Reps. Steve Cohen and Steve King) 
(claiming that the authority to appoint administrative law judges should be 
given to the Secretary of Commerce to be consistent with the Constitution). 
 457. See Pub. L. No. 110-313, § 1(a), 122 Stat. 3014, 3014–15 (2008) 
(delegating the authority to appoint administrative patent judges and 
administrative trademark judges to the Secretary of Commerce). 
 458.  The revision certainly solved the matter prospectively: future cases 
decided by the Board would not be vulnerable to challenges based on their 
issuance by improperly appointed judges. See Duffy, supra note 453, at 919 
(discussing how the 2008 appointment structure of administrative patent judges 
has solved the constitutional problem of the previous appointment structure). 
However, the statute also purported to make the change retroactive in two 
ways. One was to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to deem the 
appointment of a Director-appointed judge to “take effect on the date” of the 
initial appointment. Pub. L. No. 110-313, § 1(c), 122 Stat 3014 (2008). The other 
was to establish the “de facto officer” doctrine as a defense to any challenge 
against a Director-appointed judge. Id. § 1(d). Neither of these is necessarily a 
“constitutionally rigorous solution” to the problem of retroactivity. Duffy, supra 
note 453, at 920. Interest in the subject appears to have died down since the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the leading active challenge to the Patent 
Office’s prior practice. See generally Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Dudas, 555 U.S. 
813 (2008). 
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cannot define the powers of PTAB judges unless he appoints 
them, and he cannot constitutionally appoint them.459 
This is not to say, of course, that the Director cannot assign 
to anyone else the screening of petitions for post-issuance review 
under the AIA. The sheer volume of petitions runs into over a 
thousand per year,460 and it would be infeasible and absurd to 
forbid sub-delegation altogether. The question is, among those 
whom the Director can properly appoint, who can properly carry 
out the screening function in the Director’s place? 
One sensible solution is to differentiate those who can screen 
from those who can adjudicate based on the Appointments Clause 
jurisprudence itself.461 What makes it necessary for the Secretary 
of Commerce to appoint PTAB judges is that they are “inferior 
Officers—who perform significant functions pursuant to law and 
who are subject to the Appointments Clause” rather than “mere 
employees, who are lesser functionaries lacking substantial 
powers.”462 The offices of PTAB judges are “established by Law 
and they perform more than ministerial tasks”—tasks in which 
they exercise “significant discretion.”463 
By contrast, the category of employees who would screen 
petitions need not exercise the same high level of discretion as 
PTAB judges. Their offices are not “established by law” nor their 
duties “delineated in a statute.”464 Instead, they could be 
constituted merely by internal agency action in the way that 
§ 3(b)(3) envisions for the Director.465 They would not “take 
 
 459.  See supra note 457 and accompanying text (showing that the power to 
appoint PTAB judges is delegated to the Secretary of Commerce). 
 460.  UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND 
APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 3 (2017), https://perma.cc/7TRU-ZPMM (PDF). 
 461.  See Duffy, supra note 453, at 906 (claiming that “administrative patent 
judges exercise significant authority within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s 
Appointments Clause jurisprudence.”).  
 462.  See id. (discussing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) and the 
distinction between inferior Officers who are subject to the Appointments 
Clause and employees). 
 463.  Id. (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 464.  Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991). 
 465. See 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(3) (2012) (stating that the Director has authority 
over officer, employees, and agents of the Office “necessary to carry out the 
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testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, 
and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders,” 
as PTAB judges can do—indeed, must do.466 
Instead, screening petitions for further review, though not 
trivial, would be well within the competency of an agency 
employee who has ordinary, examiner-level technical expertise 
and ordinary, attorney-level legal training.467 Notably, the 
authority of the Director to appoint employees and define their 
duties, including by sub-delegation, expressly includes employees 
who are attorneys.468 Thus, although the commingling in the 
PTAB of the screening and adjudicating functions is unlawful, it 
is readily remediable under existing agency authority. 
In addition to being improper as a formal matter, 
commingling these functions is also improper for functional 
reasons. Empowering the PTAB, especially the same three-judge 
panel of PTAB judges, to screen petitions and then to adjudicate 
them obscures whether, and to what extent, judicial review is 
available for the PTAB’s actions. The outcome of the screening 
process is “final and nonappealable,” as has been the case in 
every mechanism for administrative validity review that 
Congress has ever established.469 By contrast, the subsequent 
adjudication both is subject to judicial review by statute470 and 
would be subject to judicial oversight under the Administrative 
 
functions of the Office”). 
 466. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82. 
 467. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, OFFICE OF 
ENROLLMENT AND DISCIPLINE, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION 
TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE 
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 2 (2019) 
https://perma.cc/RH8F-QEXA (PDF) (stating that the requirements for 
registration include “legal, scientific, and technical qualifications 
necessary . . . to render applicants valuable service”).  
 468. See 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(3)(A) (“The Director shall appoint such officers, 
employees (including attorneys), and agents of the Office as the Director 
considers necessary . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 469.  See supra notes 414–416 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
Director’s screening decision in administrative validity review is 
nonappealable). 
 470.  See 35 U.S.C. § 329 (stating that dissatisfied parties may appeal 
decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board). 
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Procedure Act even in the absence of a statute expressly 
authorizing review.471 The presumption is in favor of review.472 
In fact, the scope of nonappealability is even broader for 
screening in AIA proceedings. Decisions to deny petitions are 
immune from judicial oversight, and so are decisions to accept 
petitions.473 In reexamination, only decisions to deny were 
immune,474 leaving decisions to proceed subject to ordinary 
judicial review.475 
As a result, commingling the screening and adjudicating 
functions is a greater concern in the context of inter partes 
review, covered business method review, and post-grant review 
than it was for the reexamination mechanisms. Faulty decisions 
to accept petitions cannot be corrected at all by the courts.476 
Classifying issues as screening-related or adjudication-related is 
necessary for determining the availability of judicial review.477 
There is an incentive, therefore, for the Patent Office to conflate 
screening with merits adjudication both to enlarge the domain of 
its influence and action and to insulate itself from judicial review. 
 
 471. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency 
action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof.”). 
 472.  See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016) 
(recognizing the presumption in favor of judicial review in interpreting 
statutes). 
 473.  See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (immunizing the “determination by the Director 
whether to institute” regarding inter partes review) (emphasis added); see also 35 
U.S.C. § 324(e) (immunizing the “determination by the Director whether to 
institute” regarding post-grant review) (emphasis added). 
 474.  See 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1980) (immunizing the “determination by the 
Director . . . that no substantial new question of patentability has been raised”) 
(emphasis added); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2000) (same); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2002) 
(same); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2012) (same); 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (1999) (same); 35 
U.S.C. § 312(c) (2002) (same); 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (2011) (same). 
 475.  See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding 
appellate jurisdiction to opine on the contours of the “substantial new question 
of patentability” requirement). 
 476. See supra note 473 and accompanying text (stating that determinations 
by the Director not to institute review are not subject to appeal).   
 477.  Compare 35 U.S.C. § § 319, 329 (2012) (stating that a party may appeal 
the final decision of the PTAB in inter partes review and post-grant 
proceedings), with supra note 474 (explaining that the decision to institute 
review by the Director is nonappealable). 
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D. Focal Points for Reform 
As Parts II and III showed, panel stacking and the push for 
increasingly unreviewable discretion are symptoms of the recent 
tendency of the Patent Office toward aggrandizing its own power. 
As Part IV thus far has explained, the etiology has been the 
agency’s commingling of separately delegated powers—one 
reviewable, the other nonreviewable—against a backdrop of 
greater political input into the patent system. From this, there 
emerges three simple focal points for reform. 
First, the Federal Circuit should take an appropriate 
opportunity to interrogate the practice of panel stacking. The 
court’s scrutiny should include briefing on the due process issues 
that were left unresolved in Alappat and have remained open 
ever since.478 For its part, the Patent Office has continued to rely 
on the outcome of that case as the basis for its use of panel 
stacking,479 and even this justification has been overborne by 
intervening changes in the structure of administrative patent 
review. 480 
It should also include briefing on the ability of the Director of 
the Patent Office to take his screening power to determine 
whether PTAB petitions are likely enough to prevail that review 
is warranted481 and subdelegate that power to administrative 
patent judges, whom he is not constitutionally empowered to 
appoint or whose duties he is not statutorily empowered to 
define.482 
Second, the Federal Circuit should continue to view with 
skepticism the expansive interpretation of important, but 
relatively narrow provisions for nonappealability in PTAB 
 
 478.  See supra notes 255–261 and accompanying text (comparing the facts of 
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) to the current structure of the 
PTAB). 
 479. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (showing that the Patent 
Office still believes Alappat holds and relies on that case in oral argument 
before the Federal Circuit)). 
 480. See supra notes 262–270 and accompanying text (highlighting the need 
to maintain the decisional independence of the PTAB judges). 
 481. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314, 324 (stating the authority of the Director to 
authorize inter partes review and post-grant review). 
 482. See supra notes 446–458 and accompanying text (explaining that the 
Director is no longer empowered to appoint administrative patent judges). 
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review. Despite an early victory before the Federal Circuit in St. 
Jude and Achates483 and before the Supreme Court in Cuozzo,484 
the Patent Office seems to have reached a retrenchment in its 
autonomy from judicial supervision. The en banc Federal Circuit 
in Wi-Fi One485 and the Supreme Court in SAS Institute486 
rejected the most recent and most far-reaching claims of 
unreviewable agency discretion. It is the application of these 
latter precedents as refinements of the initial cases that hold the 
greatest promise for vindicating the robust presumption in favor 
of judicial review over agency action, and for preserving the 
ability of the Federal Circuit to police not only current Patent 
Office excesses, but future excesses as well.487 
Third, the Federal Circuit, in a case that properly presents 
the issue, should revisit the current Patent Office structure that 
commingles the Director’s screening powers with the PTAB’s 
adjudication powers. These powers are separately delegated in 
the organic statute that establishes administrative patent 
revocation, and the differences between them are significant.488 
One entrusts discretion to a political agency head in order to 
enable initial judgments about allocating scarce agency resources 
without immediate judicial intrusion. The other requires 
adjudication that is both based on neutral, generally applicable 
legal principles and legitimized by meaningful judicial review. To 
commingle these powers in the same entity within the Patent 
Office obscures their distinct purposes and enables the very 
pattern of aggrandizement that the agency has undertaken. The 
Federal Circuit in Ethicon declined an opportunity to address the 
merits of these issues both in its panel decision and in its denial 
 
 483. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the impact of the nonappealability of 
PTAB decisions). 
 484. See supra Part II.B (explaining the potential limits of the unreviewable 
discretion of the Patent Office). 
 485. See supra Part II.C (illustrating statutory limits on the Patent Office to 
reevaluate patent validity). 
 486. See supra Part II.D (discussing the Patent Office’s conflation of the 
power to screen petitions with the power to adjudicate). 
 487. See supra Part III.B.4 (reasoning that the inability to review PTAB 
decisions leads to a lack of judicial scrutiny by the Federal Circuit). 
 488. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 321(b) (2012) (granting the Patent Office the 
authority to “cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent”). 
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of en banc rehearing,489 though Judge Newman’s dissents in both 
instances offer a valuable roadmap for redoubling the effort to 
seek en banc review in the future.490 
V. Conclusion 
Much of the Patent Office’s recent political aggrandizement 
is a result of conflating large portions of its ordinarily reviewable 
adjudicatory process with the initial unreviewable screening 
process that it also happens to administer.491 The sustained 
campaign of the agency to conduct patent validity reviews outside 
the reach of judicial review is at the heart of the leading systemic 
controversies in patent law today. The conflation of the agency’s 
power to screen petitions with its power to adjudicate them has 
also brought with it a new opacity in how the agency reaches its 
decisions. Of particular concern are the stacking of adjudicatory 
panels until a majority emerges that can deliver politically 
palatable judgments492 and the push to expand ordinary 
nonappealability provisions to cover a wide range of adjudicatory 
activities over which the Federal Circuit would routinely exercise 
review.493 
Only six years have passed since the AIA’s post-grant trial 
proceedings went into effect. The relatively early stage at which 
these decisions have come, therefore, make this an important 
moment in the evolution of patent law’s power. Ignoring these 
problematic agency practices and allowing their underlying cause 
to persist would reinforce an already troubling status quo. 
 
 489. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1033 
(“There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute that precludes the same 
Board panel from making the decision to institute and then rendering the final 
decision.”); see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 826 F.3d 1366 
(denying the en banc rehearing on the issue of the commingling screening power 
and adjudication). 
 490. See Ethicon, 812 F.3d at 1036 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
assigning the same PTAB panel to both institute and conduct inter partes 
review is contrary to the statute, 35 U.S.C. §§ 314, 316 (2012)); Ethicon, 826 
F.3d at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting) (same). 
 491.  See supra Part II.D. 
 492. See supra Part II.A. 
 493. See supra Part III.B.4. 
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Rejecting these practices and correcting the source of their 
proliferation would do much to bring into focus the neglected, but 
powerful influence of political decision-making on the modern 
exercise of agency power over patent validity. 
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